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STRIKE OR DISMISS: INTERPRETATION OF THE
BAPCPA 109(h) CREDIT COUNSELING
REQUIREMENT
Joseph Satorius*
INTRODUCTION
In early December 2005, Guillermo Alfonso Sosa and his wife Melba
Nelly Sosa were in danger of losing their home to foreclosure.' Finding
themselves in a financial storm, Mr. and Mrs. Sosa sought the only shelter
in sight-the bankruptcy court-only to have the door slammed in their
faces. Had the Sosas sought protection two months earlier, the door would
have been wide open. Unfortunately, because they turned to the bankruptcy
court after October 17, 2005, the door was barred and locked. Surely, Mr.
and Mrs. Sosa must have committed some grave offense to receive such a
severe response.
The door was locked not because the Sosas had sought protection in bad
faith, nor because they had strategically planned to defraud creditors by
sheltering their home in bankruptcy. In fact, Mr. and Mrs. Sosa had been
working with their mortgage company to determine the exact amount that
was owed, until the last moment, when the mortgagee refused to accept the
payment and decided to foreclose. 2 The door to bankruptcy was locked
because Mr. and Mrs. Sosa had failed to receive credit counseling from a
nonprofit credit counseling agency.
Such results are common following the new credit counseling
requirement of the revised Bankruptcy Code, The Bankruptcy Abuse and
Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA), 3 effective as of October 17, 2005.
BAPCPA implemented the most dramatic changes to the bankruptcy
process since the Bankruptcy Code was enacted in 1978.4 One such change
is section 109(h), the provision requiring individuals to obtain credit
counseling from a nonprofit credit counseling agency within the 180 days
preceding a bankruptcy filing.5  With few and limited exceptions,6
* J.D. Candidate, 2008, Fordham University School of Law.
1. In re Sosa, 336 B.R. 113, 114-15 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2005).
2. Id. at 115.
3. Bankruptcy Abuse and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-9036
(West 2004 & Supp. 2006).
4. In re Tomco, 339 B.R. 145, 151 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2006).
5. 11 U.S.C.A. § 109(h).
6. Id. § 109(h)(2)-(4); see also infra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
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counseling is a prerequisite to bankruptcy relief. The inflexibility of this
requirement locks many good faith debtors, such as the Sosas, out of the
bankruptcy court and leaves them frozen outside in a financial storm.
The motives behind the requirement have been the subject of harsh
skepticism. 7 Indeed, the bankruptcy judge in the Sosa case stated that he
views the requirement as "inane" and that "to call the Act a 'consumer
protection' Act is the grossest of misnomers. '" 8 Nonetheless, the court
noted that its "hands are tied" and dismissed the case because "[t]he statute
is clear and unambiguous." 9
The real problem with the counseling requirement, however, is that even
if Mr. and Mrs. Sosa were to obtain credit counseling and return to the
court, the punishment would continue. Another provision of BAPCPA
imposes an automatic bad faith presumption when the Sosas return a second
time. Section 362(c)(3) of BAPCPA imposes this bad faith presumption
and terminates the automatic stay10-the crown jewel of bankruptcy
protection-after thirty days unless the debtor can rebut the presumption."l
"[T]his avenue," as one court noted, "poses significant burdens on
debtors."' 12 Thus, an individual like Mr. Sosa, who innocently seeks
protection by knocking on the door of the bankruptcy court, triggers a string
of events that may result in a complete bar to the bankruptcy system.
While all courts agree that the bankruptcy door is closed to an individual
who has not received credit counseling, 13 courts disagree as to how the
debtor should be turned away. This Note analyzes this divergence in
section 109(h) jurisprudence. Some courts hold that the filing of a petition
in violation of 109(h) commences a case and that the proper remedy is to
dismiss the case. 14 Under this interpretation, if a debtor subsequently
obtains credit counseling and refiles, the debtor must face the "significant
burdens" of rebutting the 362(c)(3) bad faith presumption to avoid having
the automatic stay lifted after thirty days. Other courts hold that the filing
of a petition in violation of 109(h) should merely be stricken, allowing the
debtor to obtain the counseling and return without the bad faith
presumption. 15
The decision of whether to strike or dismiss the petition of an individual
who files for bankruptcy without receiving credit counseling is much more
7. See Henry J. Sommer, Trying to Make Sense Out of Nonsense: Representing
Consumers Under the "Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of
2005,'" 79 Am. Bankr. L.J. 191, 191-92 (2005) ("[M]any of the consumer provisions of the
2005 legislation were largely drafted by lobbyists with limited knowledge of real-life
consumer bankruptcy practice."); see also In re Sosa, 336 B.R. at 114.
8. In re Sosa, 336 B.R. at 114.
9. Id. at 115.
10. 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(a); see also infra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
11. Id. § 362(c)(3).
12. In re Seaman, 340 B.R. 698, 709 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2006).
13. See infra note 65.
14. See infra Part II.A.
15. See infra Part II.B.
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than a purely academic argument about legal technicalities. Because
dismissing a petition limits future bankruptcy benefits, the label of
"dismiss" or "strike" has very real implications for many financially
distressed individuals.
Part I of this Note outlines the 109(h) credit counseling requirement and
its relation to other sections of BAPCPA. It also analyzes the legislative
history behind the provision. Part II discusses the judicial split over the
proper interpretation of 109(h). Part II.A analyzes opinions that dismiss
cases when petitions are filed in violation of 109(h), Part II.B analyzes
opinions that strike petitions, and Part II.C analyzes a potential third option
of striking petitions with prejudice to future filings. Finally, Part III argues
that the proper interpretation of the statute requires courts to strike petitions,
or upon a finding of bad faith, to strike petitions with prejudice to future
filings. It relies on a plain reading of the statute, prior interpretations of the
Bankruptcy Code, and legislative intent to conclude that petitions filed in
violation of 109(h) must be stricken.
I. BACKGROUND
Part I of this Note discusses the background of section 109(h) and the
legislative purpose of the credit counseling provision. Part L.A describes
the specific requirements of the provision and the consequences of failing to
obtain credit counseling. Part I.B discusses the legislative purpose behind
the enactment of BAPCPA and the credit counseling provision. Part I.C
illustrates how the credit counseling provision fits into the larger BAPCPA
statute.
A. Credit Counseling'6
In order to qualify for bankruptcy relief, an individual must first qualify
as a "debtor" under BAPCPA. BAPCPA sets out a number of "debtor"
qualification requirements in section 109, entitled "Who may be a
debtor."'17 For example, section 109 establishes certain conditions for
railroads, banks, municipalities, family farmers, and family fishermen. 18
BAPCPA left these provisions relatively unchanged from the 1978
Bankruptcy Code. BAPCPA, however, did add a credit counseling
requirement-an entirely new condition required for an individual to
qualify as a debtor under section 109.19
16. For a history of the credit counseling industry, see Permanent Subcomm. on
Investigations, Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, Profiteering in a Non-
Profit Industry: Abusive Practices in Credit Counseling, S. Rep. No. 109-55, at 4-5, 34-36
(2005); Karen Gross & Susan Block-Lieb, Empty Mandate or Opportunity for Innovation?
Pre-Petition Credit Counseling and Post-Petition Financial Management Education, 13 Am.
Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 549, 553-54 (2005).
17. Bankruptcy Abuse and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 11 U.S.C.A. § 109 (West
2004 & Supp. 2006).
18. Id. §§ 109(a)-(f).
19. Id. § 109(h).
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The credit counseling provision requires a petitioner to seek credit
counseling from an approved nonprofit budget and credit counseling agency
within the 180 days preceding the filing of a bankruptcy petition. 20 This
requirement falls under section 109. Thus, a person must receive credit
counseling in order to qualify as a "debtor" for the purposes of bankruptcy.
If a petitioner fails to obtain the required credit counseling, he or she will
not qualify as a "debtor" under the Act and will be precluded from
obtaining bankruptcy relief.
The Act provides for only three exceptions to the counseling
requirement. 21  First, a petitioner is excused from the counseling
requirement if the U.S. Trustee or bankruptcy administrator determines that
there are no adequate credit counseling agencies in the district.22 Second, a
petitioner is excused if the petitioner submits a certification to the court that
(i) describes exigent circumstances that merit a waiver of the requirement; 23
(ii) states that the petitioner requested credit counseling services but was
unable to obtain the services during the five day period beginning on the
date of the request; and (iii) is satisfactory to the court. 24 Finally, a
petitioner is excused if he or she is unable to obtain counseling due to
incapacity, disability, or active duty in a military combat zone.25 If a
petitioner does not obtain the required credit counseling certificate and does
not fall under one of these three exceptions, the petitioner does not qualify
as a "debtor" under section 109 and will be ineligible for bankruptcy relief.
Depending on how the bankruptcy court handles the inadequate petition, the
20. Id. § 109(h)(1).
21. Id. §§ 109(h)(2)-(4).
22. Id. § 109(h)(2)(A).
23. Since the enactment of the Bankruptcy Abuse and Consumer Protection Act of 2005
(BAPCPA), there has developed substantial disagreement on what qualifies as an exigent
circumstance. Compare, e.g., In re Miller, 336 B.R. 232 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2006) (finding
that the foreclosure sale of a residence constitutes an exigent circumstance), and In re Petit-
Louis, 338 B.R. 132 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2006) (finding that a lack of counseling services in the
debtor's language constitutes an exigent circumstance), and In re Davenport, 335 B.R. 218
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2005) (finding that repossession of a motor vehicle constitutes an exigent
circumstance), and In re Childs, 335 B.R. 623 (Bankr. D. Md. 2005) (finding that eviction
from a residence constitutes an exigent circumstance), and In re Graham, 336 B.R. 292
(Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2005) (finding that the shutoff of residential utility services constitutes an
exigent circumstance), with In re DiPinto, 336 BR. 693 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2006) (finding that
the foreclosure sale of a residence does not constitute an exigent circumstance), and In re
Henderson, 339 B.R. 34 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2006) (finding that the necessity of finding an
attorney does not constitute an exigent circumstance), and In re Rodriguez, 336 B.R. 462
(Bankr. D. Idaho 2005) (finding that the garnishment of wages does not constitute an exigent
circumstance), and In re Curington, No. 05-38188, 2005 WL 3752229 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn.
Dec. 7, 2005) (finding that an inability to pay for credit counseling does not constitute an
exigent circumstance), and In re Hubbard, 333 BR. 377 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005) (finding
that the repossession of motor vehicle does not constitute an exigent circumstance).
24. 11 U.S.C.A. § 109(h)(3).
25. Id. § 109(h)(4).
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failure to meet the credit counseling requirement can have a significant
impact on the petitioner's ability to obtain future bankruptcy relief.26
The drafters of BAPCPA gave consideration to the significant criticism
of the credit counseling industry when crafting the credit counseling
requirement.27 The focus of the criticism is directed toward aggressive
entrants into the credit counseling market that cause high fees, misleading
advertising, poor service, and an industry focused on profits rather than
debtor counseling.28 The Senate Subcommittee on Investigations under the
Committee of Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs issued a 2005
report on these concerns and concluded that "[c]learly, something is wrong
with the credit counseling industry. ' 29 To address this concern, Congress
stipulated that only credit counseling agencies that are certified as approved
providers by the U.S. Trustee can provide the required credit counseling. 30
The requirements to become an approved credit counseling agency are
outlined in section 111 of BAPCPA. 31 A credit counseling agency must
meet a significant number of conditions before obtaining approval, 32 and
the list of approved agencies is to be maintained in the office of the clerk of
26. See infra Part II for a discussion on the effects of dismissing a petition as opposed to
striking a petition where the petitioner has not satisfied the credit counseling requirement.
27. See, e.g., Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations, Comm. on Homeland Sec. &
Governmental Affairs, Profiteering in a Non-Profit Industry: Abusive Practices in Credit
Counseling, S. Rep. No. 109-55, at 2-3 (2005) (discussing high fees and poor service);
Deanne Loonin & Travis Plunkett, Nat'l Consumer Law Ctr., Credit Counseling in Crisis:
The Impact on Consumers of Funding Cuts, Higher Fees and Aggressive New Market
Entrants 8-9 (2003), available at www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/credit-counseling-report.pdf
(stating that counseling agencies have a lack of face-to-face contact with consumers; offer
nothing but debt-management plans; promote aggressive and sometimes abusive marketing
practices; pick and choose creditors; demand higher costs for service; and maintain close
connections with for-profit businesses); Richard L. Stehl, The Failings of the Credit
Counseling and Debtor Education Requirements of the Proposed Consumer Bankruptcy
Reform Legislation of 1998, 7 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 133, 154-56 (1999) ("Placing the
responsibility of negotiating pre-petition debt repayment plans in the hands of credit
counselors is precarious since the majority of funding for the credit counseling industry
comes from commissions and subsidies paid to the credit counseling agencies by credit card
issuers.").
28. Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations, Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental
Affairs, Profiteering in a Non-Profit Industry: Abusive Practices in Credit Counseling, S.
Rep. No. 109-55, at 1-4.
29. Id. at 4.
30. 11 U.S.C.A. § 111.
31. Id.
32. Id. § 111(c) (providing that an agency must demonstrate that it has a board of
directors, the majority of which are not employed by the agency nor will financially benefit
from the outcome of the services; charges a reasonable fee and provides services without
regard to ability to pay the fee; provides safekeeping and payment of client fumds; provides
full disclosures to client; provides adequate counseling to client; provides trained counselors
who receive no commission or bonus based on the outcome of the counseling; demonstrates
adequate experience and background in providing counseling; and has adequate financial
resources to provide continuing support services).
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the bankruptcy court. 33 The U.S. Trustee of the district must approve the
agency as well as the courses and instructional material to be used.34
B. Legislative Intent of BAPCPA and the Credit Counseling Requirement
In the House Judiciary Committee report on BAPCPA, the Committee
stated that "[tlhe purpose of the bill is to improve bankruptcy law and
practice by restoring personal responsibility and integrity in the bankruptcy
system and ensure that the system is fair for both debtors and creditors. '35
In a response to creditor interests, the Committee declared that BAPCPA
will "respond to many of the factors contributing to the increase in
consumer bankruptcy filings, such as lack of personal financial
accountability, the proliferation of serial filings, and the absence of
effective oversight to eliminate abuse in the system." 36 The Committee
cited four primary factors as generating the need for bankruptcy reform.
First, the Committee noted that the number of bankruptcy filings "nearly
doubled to more than 1.6 million cases filed in fiscal year 2004" 37 and cited
the "growing perception that bankruptcy relief may be too readily available
and is sometimes used as a first resort, rather than a last resort."'38 While
many scholars argue that most bankruptcy filings are a result of sudden
tragedy, such as divorce, illness, or unemployment, 39 the Committee
concluded that reform is nonetheless necessary. Second, the Committee
noted the "significant" economic losses associated with insolvent debtors. 40
Specifically, it was estimated that in 1997, $44 billion of debt was
33. Id. § 111(a).
34. Id. §§ lll(b)-(d).
35. H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection
Act of 2005, H.R. Rep. No. 109-31(I), at 2 (2005).
36. Id. (footnote omitted). For an argument that the credit industry, and not
opportunistic debtors who "abuse" the bankruptcy system, is responsible for the increase in
bankruptcy filings, see Susan Block-Lieb & Edward J. Janger, The Myth of the Rational
Borrower: Rationality, Behavioralism, and the Misguided "Reform " of Bankruptcy Law, 84
Tex. L. Rev. 1481, 1488 (2006) ("[Lenders] have increased the riskiness of the credit pool,
lending to borrowers who would not have been profitable in a world of informational
asymmetries and usury limits .. "); Jean Braucher, Theories of Overindebtedness:
Interaction of Structure and Culture, 7 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 323, 327-32 (2006);
Loonin & Plunkett, supra note 27, at 1 ("Low creditor concessions cause more consumers to
drop off [debtor management plans] and to declare bankruptcy.").
37. H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection
Act of 2005, H.R. Rep. No. 109-31(I), at 4.
38. Id.
39. See Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations, Comm. on Homeland Sec. &
Governmental Affairs, Profiteering in a Non-Profit Industry: Abusive Practices in Credit
Counseling, S. Rep. No. 109-55, at 2 (2005); Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & Jay
Lawrence Westbrook, The Fragile Middle Class: Americans in Debt 15-21 (2000) (citing a
study where 67.5% of debtors reported filing because of a job loss, 22.1% reported filing
because of a family issue, and 19.3% reported filing because of medical issues, and multiple
responses were permitted); Braucher, supra note 36, at 332 ("Families are driven to borrow
more after job loss, divorce or illness .... ).
40. H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection
Act of 2005, H.R. Rep. No. 109-3 1(I), at 4.
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discharged by debtors through bankruptcy relief and that this loss translated
to a $400 annual "tax" on every household in America.41 The Committee
also referenced a credit industry newsletter 42 stating that the $18.9 billion
loss to credit card companies from consumer bankruptcy filings in 2002
was an increase of 15.1 percent over the prior year.43 Third, the Committee
proclaimed that "the present bankruptcy system has loopholes and
incentives that allow and-sometimes--even encourage opportunistic
personal filings and abuse" 44 and stated that "[a]ccording to the U.S.
Trustee Program, '[a]buse of the system is more widespread than many
would have estimated.' 45 Fourth, the Committee questioned the need for
many debtors to file bankruptcy, stating that "some bankruptcy debtors are
able to repay a significant portion of their debts." 46
41. Id.
42. Id. at 4-5.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 5; see also Michelle J. White, Personal Bankruptcy Under the 1978
Bankruptcy Code: An Economic Analysis, 63 Ind. L.J. 1, 45-47 (1987) (concluding that the
number of Chapter 7 bankruptcy filings is positively related to the bankruptcy exemption
level of the state); Michelle J. White, Why it Pays to File for Bankruptcy: A Critical Look at
the Incentives Under U.S. Personal Bankruptcy Law and a Proposal for Change, 65 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 685, 693-700 (1998). For an argument that consumers are, for the most part, not
strategic or opportunistic, see Block-Lieb & Janger, supra note 36; F. H. Buckley &
Margaret F. Brinig, The Bankruptcy Puzzle, 27 J. Legal Stud. 187, 204-05 (1998) (stating
that the bankruptcy filing rate is negatively related to exemption level).
45. H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection
Act of 2005, H.R. Rep. No. 109-31(I), at 5 (quoting J. Christopher Marshall, Civil
Enforcement: An Early Report, J. of the Nat'l. Ass'n. of Bankr. Trustees, Fall 2002, at 39,
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ust/eo/public affairs/articles/docs/nabtalkfall2002.htm).
It is interesting to note that the Committee attributes this statement to the U.S. Trustee
Program when the statement was in fact written by J. Christopher Marshall, a U.S. Trustee,
in a personal capacity. In fact, Marshall's article provides a disclaimer stating that "[t]he
views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent, and
should not be attributed to, the Executive Office for U.S. Trustees, the U.S. Trustee Program,
or the Department of Justice." Marshall, supra, at 39 n. 1. This misattribution of the
statement to the U.S. Trustee Program may arguably be an indication of congressional
efforts to overstate the "abuse" of the bankruptcy system in an attempt to justify various
reforms needed to appease the financially powerful creditor lobby. Such an assertion and
argument, however, is beyond the scope of this Note. For an argument that the creditor
lobby exercised significant influence on the formation of BAPCPA, see Sommer, supra note
7.
46. H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection
Act of 2005, H.R. Rep. No. 109-31 (I), at 5 (citing Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999 (Pt. II):
Hearing on H.R. 833 Before Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. L. of the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 298 (1999)); id. at 5 n. 18 (quoting Michael E. Staten of the Credit
Research Center, who stated that "about 25 percent of chapter 7 debtors could have repaid at
least 30% of their non-housing debts over a 5-year repayment plan"). But see Marianne B.
Culhane & Michaela M. White, Taking the New Consumer Bankruptcy Model for a Test
Drive: Means-Testing Real Chapter 7 Debtors, 7 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 27, 31 (1999)
("[A]buse of chapter 7, in the form of filings by debtors who could repay... appears
minimal."); Stehl, supra note 27, at 153 (stating that "the results of several studies leave
open the significant question of whether a majority of debtors can even pay a small portion
of their non-priority unsecured debt"); Press Release, Nat'l Ass'n of Consumer Bankr.
Att'ys, Study: Controversial Bankruptcy Law Reforms Not Working? 97 Percent Unable to
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These four factors resulted in a congressional effort to "restor[e] personal
responsibility and integrity in the bankruptcy system and ensure that the
system is fair for both debtors and creditors." 47  Within this context,
Congress inserted the credit counseling requirement as a prerequisite for
obtaining bankruptcy relief.48 The House Report on BAPCPA plainly
states that the credit counseling requirement is intended as a protection and
safeguard for debtors-a final stop on the path to bankruptcy to ensure that
the debtor makes an informed choice about filing a bankruptcy petition.49
The required counseling session does not have to be a lengthy or exhaustive
process for the petitioner. The counseling can be conducted via phone or
Internet and must only "outline[] the opportunities for available credit
counseling and assist[] such individual in performing a related budget
analysis." 50 The fact that the counseling requirement can be satisfied with a
phone call or Internet session in the final days of a petitioner's financial
distress has caused many scholars to question the usefulness of the
counseling.51
C. A Broader Look at BAPCPA
How does an individual who files a bankruptcy petition fall under the
power of the bankruptcy court? Jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases is
granted to the federal district courts by 28 U.S.C. § 1334,52 and jurisdiction
is granted from the district courts to the federal bankruptcy courts by 28
Repay Debts, Most Pushed to Brink by Crisis (Feb. 22, 2002), available at
http://nacba.com/news/releases/022206.php.
47. H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection
Act of 2005, H.R. Rep. No. 109-31(I), at 2.
48. See supra notes 16-34 and accompanying text.
49. H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection
Act of 2005, H.R. Rep. No. 109-31(I), at 2 ("[BAPCPA] also includes various consumer
protection reforms .... It requires debtors to receive credit counseling before they can be
eligible for bankruptcy relief so that they will make an informed choice about bankruptcy, its
alternatives, and consequences."); id. at 18 ("[C]redit counseling provisions are intended to
give consumers in financial distress an opportunity to learn about the consequences of
bankruptcy-such as the potentially devastating effect it can have on their credit
rating .... ).
50. 11 U.S.C.A. § 109(h)(1) (West 2004 & Supp. 2006).
51. See, e.g., Block-Lieb & Janger, supra note 36, at 1561 ("We also question the
efficacy of mandatory counseling on the eve of bankruptcy, as required by the 2005
amendments to the Bankruptcy Code."); A. Mechele Dickerson, Can Shame, Guilt, or
Stigma Be Taught? Why Credit-Focused Debtor Education May Not Work, 32 Loy. L.A. L.
Rev. 945, 952 (1999) ("Requiring debtors.., to complete a credit-counseling course as a
prerequisite to bankruptcy could have dire financial consequences .... [M]ost people file for
bankruptcy because they need immediate economic relief."); Stehl, supra note 27, at 148 ("It
is often preferable for individuals to resolve their financial difficulties outside of the
bankruptcy arena. It is highly questionable, however, whether the proposed precondition to
bankruptcy relief of credit counseling will achieve that desired result." (footnote omitted)).
For a discussion of the problems of credit counseling agencies requiring payment from
financially distressed debtors, see id. at 156, 159.
52. 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (2000) ("[T]he district courts shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction of all cases under title 11 .").
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U.S.C. § 157.53 The Bankruptcy Code itself does not mention jurisdiction,
nor does it grant jurisdiction to the bankruptcy courts.
Assuming that an individual is fully eligible for bankruptcy relief 4 when
filing a bankruptcy petition, a case is commenced pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §
301(a), which states that "[a] voluntary case ... is commenced by the filing
with the bankruptcy court of a petition... by an entity that may be a
debtor." 55 To find out if an entity "may be a debtor," BAPCPA directs us
to section 109, which lists the requirements to qualify as a debtor.56 For
example, section 109(g) (a pre-BAPCPA requirement that remains
unchanged in BAPCPA) provides that an individual is ineligible to be a
debtor if he or she has willfully failed to abide by an order of the court, or
has requested and obtained the voluntary dismissal of a case. 57
When an eligible debtor files for bankruptcy, the powerful protection of
the automatic stay is invoked under section 362(a). 58 The automatic stay is
"one of the most powerful weapons known to the law" 59 as it protects the
debtor from collection actions by both secured and unsecured creditors. 60
BAPCPA also outlines circumstances that provide for the dismissal of a
case.61 Under a new BAPCPA provision, section 362(c)(3), dismissal of a
case limits the benefits available to the debtor in a future bankruptcy
filing.62 Section 362(c)(3) dictates that if an individual commences a
second bankruptcy case within one year of a previously pending bankruptcy
case, the automatic stay is only in effect for thirty days. 63 There is a
statutory presumption that the second filing is in bad faith, and the burden is
on the debtor to rebut the presumption in order to extend the stay past thirty
days. 64 Thus, the decision to dismiss a case can critically affect a debtor's
future bankruptcy options.
53. Id. § 157 ("Each district court may provide that any and all cases under title 11 and
any or all proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or related to a case under title 11
shall be referred to the bankruptcy judges for the district.").
54. For background purposes, it is important to assume that the individual is fully
eligible for relief because the focus of this Note centers on whether a debtor ineligible for
bankruptcy can commence a case under title 11.
55. 11 U.S.C.A. § 301(a).
56. Id. § 109.
57. Id. § 109(g).
58. Id. § 362(a).
59. In re Russo, 94 B.R. 127, 129 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988).
60. The automatic stay is subject to a handful of exceptions not relevant to this Note.
See II U.S.C.A. §§ 362(a), (b).
61. Id. §§ 521(i), 707, 1112, 1208, 1307.
62. Id. § 362(c)(3).
63. Id. § 362(c)(3)(A). Without this limitation, the automatic stay is in effect until the
bankruptcy court lifts the stay or the debtor emerges from bankruptcy.
64. Id. § 362(c)(3)(C). Needless to say, this presumption creates a significant hurdle in
the second filing because the ability to rebut the presumption is highly fact specific and the
outcome is unpredictable. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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II. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF 109(h): How BANKRUPTCY COURTS
HANDLE BANKRUPTCY PETITIONERS WHO FAIL TO MEET THE CREDIT
COUNSELING REQUIREMENT
Although BAPCPA is little more than one year old, there is already
substantial judicial disagreement and confusion over how to interpret the
provisions of section 109(h). While courts agree that a debtor who has not
satisfied the 109(h) credit counseling requirement is not eligible to be a
"debtor" and cannot enjoy the benefits of bankruptcy, 65 courts disagree on
how to handle the bankruptcy petition of an individual who is ineligible to
be a debtor under section 109(h). Some courts strike inadequate petitions,66
while other courts dismiss the case. 67 The decision of whether to dismiss or
to strike the petition of an ineligible debtor can have serious consequences
for the individual per section 362(c)(3). 68 Thus, a seemingly semantic
disagreement becomes a matter of extreme importance to the debtor who
has failed to receive credit counseling.
Part II of this Note examines the different methods (strike or dismiss)
courts use to dispose of petitions filed in violation of section 109(h). Part
II.A explores the arguments advanced by courts that dismiss cases in which
petitioners who have failed to obtain credit counseling. Part II.A. 1 looks at
prior interpretations of the Bankruptcy Code, specifically, section 109(g)
and section 109(e). Part II.A.2 discusses a plain reading of the Code, and
Part II.A.3 considers the practical consequences of dismissing a case. Part
II.B analyzes the arguments advanced by courts that strike petitions filed in
violation of section 109(h). Part II.B. 1 looks at prior interpretations of the
Bankruptcy Code, Part Il.B.2 discusses a plain reading of the Code, and
Part I.B.3 considers the practical consequences of striking a petition.
Finally, Part II.C will examine a possible third remedy: striking petitions
with prejudice.
The crux of this disagreement hinges on one crucial question: Does the
inadequate petition commence a "case" which must be dismissed by the
court, or does the failure to satisfy the 109(h) credit counseling requirement
mean that no "case" is commenced and that the proper remedy is to strike
the petition? This part will consider both of these approaches in detail.
65. See In re Elmendorf, 345 B.R. 486, 495 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006) ("Section 109(h)
has been strictly construed by courts, and all courts that have decided the issue have stated
that a debtor that does not receive credit-counseling prior to filing for bankruptcy relief, or
seek and receive an 'extension' pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 109(h)(3), is ineligible to be a
debtor.").
66. See supra Part II.B (discussing the arguments for striking petitions when a petition is
filed in violation of section 109(h)).
67. See supra Part II.A (discussing the arguments for dismissing cases when a petition is
filed in violation of section 109(h)).
68. See infra notes 128-29 and accompanying text.
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A. A Bankruptcy Petition Filed in Violation of 109(h) Nevertheless
Commences a "Case" Which Must be Dismissed for Such Violation
Courts that dismiss petitions filed in violation of section 109(h)
("dismissal courts") have determined that a violation of the 109(h) credit
counseling requirement does not deprive the court of jurisdiction. The
filing of a petition in violation of section 109(h) nonetheless invokes the
jurisdiction of the court and therefore commences a "case" which must be
dismissed because the petitioner has not received the required credit
counseling. Dismissal courts have come to this conclusion by relying on
prior interpretations of the Bankruptcy Code, a plain reading of BAPCPA,
and the practical consequences of dismissing a case.
1. Prior Interpretations of the Bankruptcy Code
a. Pre-BAPCPA Jurisprudence with Regard to Section 109(g)
In two cases, In re Seaman69 and In re Ross,70 bankruptcy courts have
looked to prior interpretations of section 109(g), 71 which is another debtor
eligibility provision of the Bankruptcy Code, to determine that the new
section 109(h) provision of BAPCPA is not jurisdictional. Like 109(h),
109(g) is found under section 109, which is entitled "Who may be a
debtor."' 72 Section 109(g) provides that an individual is ineligible to be a
debtor under the Code if he or she has willfully failed to abide by an order
of the court or has requested and obtained the voluntary dismissal of a
case.73 The Seaman and Ross courts looked to a pre-BAPCPA case, In re
Flores,74 which considered whether a petition filed by an individual in
violation of 109(g) commenced a case.
The Flores court concluded that a petition filed in violation of 109(g) is
not a nullity and effectively commences a case invoking the subject matter
jurisdiction of the court.75 The court explained that "a bankruptcy filing [in
violation of] 109(g) cannot be a nullity... because there is a threshold
issue to be decided, the issue of whether the debtor 'may be a debtor' in the
subsequent case."'76 In reaching this conclusion, the court relied heavily on
the importance of the automatic stay.77 If a petition filed in violation of
69. 340 B.R. 698 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2006).
70. 338 B.R. 134 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2006).
71. 11 U.S.C.A. § 109(g) (West 2004 & Supp. 2006).
72. Id. § 109.
73. Id. § 109(g).
74. 291 B.R. 44 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003).
75. Id. But see In re Hollberg, 208 B.R. 755 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1997).
76. In re Flores, 291 B.R. at 52.
77. Id. at 50 ("It is important to emphasize that the automatic stay is intended for the
protection not only of the debtor, but for the benefit of all creditors as well."); see also supra
notes 55-57 and accompanying text (explaining that the automatic stay is one of the most
important weapons known to law).
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109(g) is a nullity, the Flores court reasoned, then no case would
commence and the automatic stay would not be imposed. 78 Thus, there
would be a period of uncertainty as to whether the automatic stay is in force
between the time an individual filed a petition and the time the court
determined the petitioner's eligibility under 109(g). During this time,
creditors would be uncertain as to whether an automatic stay was in effect
or whether they could move forward with debt collection on secured
collateral. While some creditors might await the court's determination,
other creditors might move forward with debt collection. This reading, the
court implied, would allow a secured creditor to make the determination
that a petition was filed in violation of 109(g)-a determination which must
be left to the court. 79 Furthermore, this period of uncertainty would allow
some creditors to gain a collection advantage over others, a result the Flores
court noted is wholly at odds with a central purpose of bankruptcy. 80
Because a petition filed in violation of 109(h) should have essentially the
same consequences as a petition filed in violation of 109(g), the Seaman
and Ross courts followed the reasoning in Flores and concluded that a
petition filed where the individual has not satisfied the 109(h) credit
counseling requirement nonetheless commences a case and imposes the
automatic stay.81 If a case is "commenced" when a petition is filed in
violation of 109(h), it follows that the proper remedy is dismissal.
b. Pre-BAPCPA Jurisprudence with Regard to Section 109(e)
The Seaman court looked to another section 109 provision, section
109(e), for guidance on the proper treatment for a petition filed in violation
of 109(h).82 Section 109(e) provides that a debtor under chapter 13 must
have "regular income" and debts that do not exceed proscribed limits. 83
Courts have concluded that a chapter 13 petitioner, who is ineligible under
78. See Avi v. Sears Say. Bank, No. 86-6773, slip op. at 1 (9th Cir. Mar. 22, 1989)
("Section 362 provides for an automatic stay following the commencement of a case ... .
79. In re Flores, 291 B.R. at 52-53.
80. Id. at 50-51 ("'One of the principal purposes of the automatic stay is to preserve the
property of the debtor's estate for the benefit of all creditors."' (quoting In re Prudential
Lines, Inc., 928 F.2d 565, 573-74 (2d Cir. 1991))); see also Constitution Bank v. Tubbs, 68
F.3d 685, 691 (3d Cir. 1995) ("[Al purpose of the automatic stay is... to protect 'creditors
by preventing particular creditors from acting unilaterally in self-interest to obtain payment
from a debtor to the detriment of other creditors."' (quoting Mar. Elec. Co. v. United Jersey
Bank, 959 F.2d 1194, 1204 (3d Cir. 1991))); In re Walker, 51 F.3d 562, 566 (5th Cir. 1995)
("[Tihe automatic stay is designed to protect debtors from creditors and creditors from each
other.").
81. In re Seaman, 340 B.R. 698, 702 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2006); In re Ross, 338 B.R. 134,
136 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2006) ("Significantly, Congress did not provide a different
consequence for § 109(h) ineligibility than for ineligibility under any other provision of §
109. Nothing in the statutory language indicates an intent to establish a new rule for
petitions filed by debtors ineligible under § 109(h). It follows that ineligibility under §
109(h) should be treated like ineligibility under any other provision of § 109.").
82. In re Seaman, 340 B.R. at 701.
83. 11 U.S.C.A. § 109(e) (West 2004 & Supp. 2006).
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109(e), nonetheless commences a case by filing a petition-a case which
must be dismissed.84 Because 109(e) is found in the same "Who may be a
debtor" section as 109(h), the Seaman court reasoned that 109(h) merits the
same interpretation as 109(e) and that a petition filed in violation of 109(h),
like a petition filed in violation of 109(e), commences a case.
2. Plain Reading of the Statute
Courts further conclude that a plain reading of BAPCPA dictates that the
109(h) credit counseling requirement is not jurisdictional in nature and that
a petition filed in violation of 109(h) therefore commences a case.
a. The Jurisdictional Grant of 28 U.S. C. § 1334
In In re Tomco,85 the court noted that no provision in BAPCPA mentions
jurisdiction86 and that bankruptcy courts are granted subject matter
jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases through 28 U.S.C. § 133487 and 28
U.S.C. § 157,88 not through title 11.89 Because the source of jurisdiction
flows from title 28 and not title 11, a provision under title 11, such as the
109(h) credit counseling requirement, cannot deprive the bankruptcy courts
of jurisdiction.90
b. Other Provisions of BAPCPA
Other provisions in the Code may also shed light on section 109(h). The
Tomco court looked to sections 707,91 1112,92 1208, 93 and 130794 of
BAPCPA, which "enumerate circumstances upon which a court may
dismiss an individual consumer's bankruptcy case."' 95 The Tomco court
observed that none of the provisions exclude from "'cause' for dismissal"
84. See, e.g., Dillon v. Tex. Comm'n on Envtl. Quality, 138 F. App'x 609, 612 (5th Cir.
2005); In re Seaman, 340 BR. at 701-02 (citing In re Mazzeo, 131 F.3d 295 (2d Cir. 1997));
In re Rifkin, 124 B.R. 626, 629 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1991)).
85. 339 B.R. 145 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2006).
86. Id. at 159.
87. "[T]he district courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases under
title 11." 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (2000).
88. "Each district court may provide that any or all cases under title 11 and any or all
proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or related to a case under title 11 shall be
referred to the bankruptcy judges for the district." Id. § 157.
89. In re Tomco, 339 B.R. at 159.
90. Id. But see In re Hawkins, 340 B.R. 642, 646 (Bankr. D.D.C. 2006) (arguing that
while a petition filed in violation of 109(h) does not commence a case, the court can assert
limited jurisdiction because "[e]very federal court necessarily has the jurisdiction to
determine whether it has subject matter jurisdiction over the case or controversy before it."
(citing Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 376 (1940))).
91. 11 U.S.C.A. § 707 (West 2004 & Supp. 2006).
92. Id. § 1112.
93. Id. § 1208.
94. Id. § 1307.
95. In re Tomco, 339 B.R. at 158.
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an individual's ineligibility under 109(h). 96 There is no need for Congress
expressly to include ineligibility under 109(h) as an item for "'cause' for
dismissal" because Congress states that "cause for dismissal expressly
'includes' the items enumerated therein."'97 Section 102 of BAPCPA,
entitled "Rules of Construction," provides that Congress's use of the term
"includes" is "not limiting." 98 Given these rules of construction, the Tomco
court determined that "'cause' for dismissal of a bankruptcy case is not
limited to the enumerated statutory list(s) [of sections 707, 1112, 1208, and
1307], and a debtor's ineligibility [for failure to satisfy section 109(h)]
constitutes one such item of cause." 99 Thus, the Tomco court reasoned that
dismissing the case when a petition is filed in violation of 109(h) is not at
odds with other provisions in the Code. 100
The Seaman court further relied on several other sections of the
Bankruptcy Code, such as sections 707(a)(3), 1307(c)(9), and 1112(e), 101
which list documents that the debtor must file with the court. If the debtor
does not file the documents, the case is dismissed. The court used this as
further evidence that dismissal is the appropriate remedy for ineligible
petitioners.
c. The Surplusage Argument: Section 362(b)(21)(A)
Before the surplusage argument can be properly analyzed, it is essential
to note that the foundation of this argument is that the automatic stay' 02 is
only activated when a case is commenced. 10 3 Put another way, if the
automatic stay is in effect, there is a case before the court. Section 362(b)
provides exceptions to the automatic stay. A new BAPCPA exception
under 362(b)(21)(A) states that if a debtor is ineligible under section
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. 11 U.S.C.A. § 102(3).
99. In re Tomco, 339 B.R. at 158 (citing In re Ross, 338 B.R. 134 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
2006)).
100. Id. at 158; see also In re Wallert, 332 B.R. 884, 891 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2005) ("On its
face, II U.S.C. § 707(a) requires 'cause' before a petition under Chapter 7 may be
dismissed. A lack of statutory eligibility to 'be a debtor,' if it goes to a default on the part of
the debtor that is incapable of cure under the very terms of the Code, is the very most
fundamental 'cause' for dismissal.").
101. In re Seaman, 340 B.R. 698, 702-03 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2006) (citing 11 U.S.C.A. §§
707(a)(3), 1307(c)(9), 1112(e)).
102. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
103. See Avi v. Sears Say. Bank, No. 86-6773, slip. op. at 1 (9th Cir. Mar. 22, 1989)
("Section 362 provides for an automatic stay following the commencement of a case .... );
In re Parrish, 171 B.R. 138, 140 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1994) ("The automatic stay [is] imposed
routinely upon commencement of a case .... ); In re Dexter, 116 B.R. 92, 93 (Bankr. S.D.
Ohio 1990) ("The commencement of a case also activates the automatic stay .. "). But see
In re Thompson, 344 B.R. 899, 906 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 2006) ("This court does not believe
that 'commencement' of the case is the exclusive prerequisite for the imposition of the
automatic stay.").
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109(g), 10 4 then the automatic stay is not in effect with respect to liens or
security interests in real property. 10 5 Through this provision, Congress
identified a specific situation (real property) where an individual ineligible
under 109(g) is not protected by the automatic stay. From this, it is inferred
that outside of the specific situation involving real property, individuals
ineligible under 109(g) are protected by the automatic stay. It is further
inferred that petitioners ineligible under other subparts of section 109, such
as the 109(h) credit counseling requirement, are protected by the automatic
stay.106 If such petitioners were not protected by the automatic stay, the
362(b)(21)(A) amendment would be unnecessary and superfluous. 10 7 "As
Congress 'is presumed to know the state of existing law when it enacts
legislation,' the enactment of additional exceptions to the automatic stay
evidences the understanding of Congress that a bankruptcy filing in
violation of Section 109 commences a case and results in an automatic
stay."10 8  To avoid statutory surplusage, it is argued that section
362(b)(21)(A) must be read to conclude that petitioners ineligible under
109(h) are nonetheless protected by the automatic stay; therefore, a case
must commence when a petition is filed in violation of 109(h). 109 Because
a case is commenced, the proper remedy for a petition filed in violation of
109(h) is dismissal of the case.11 0
104. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 109(g) (West 2004 & Supp. 2006); see also supra notes 69-80
and accompanying text.
105. 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(b)(21)(A).
106. See In re Racette, 343 B.R. 200, 202 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2006); In re Seaman, 340
B.R. at 707-08; In re Tomco, 339 B.R. 145, 160 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2006); In re Ross, 338
B.R. 134, 138-39 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2006).
107. In re Seaman, 340 B.R. at 707-08; In re Ross, 338 B.R. at 139 (stating that "such an
amendment would not have been necessary"); see also Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic,
726 F.2d 774, 778 (1984) (Edwards, J., concurring) ("There is a fundamental principle of
statutory construction that a statute should not be construed so as to render any part of it
'inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant."' (quoting 2A C. Sands, Statutes and
Statutory Construction § 46.06 (4th ed. 1973))).
108. In re Tomco, 339 B.R. at 160-61 (quoting Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677,
699 (1979)). But see In re Hawkins, 340 B.R. 642, 645 (Bankr. D.D.C. 2006) ("There are
many reasons why Congress might have amended § 362 in the way that it did. Congress
may have focused on § 109(g) because courts were split with respect to the effect of that
specific sub-part of the statute at the time of the congressional amendment. In other words,
it may be the case that § 109(g)--and only § 109(g)--was on Congress' mind when it
revised § 362. It is therefore no mystery why Congress would amend § 362 to refer to §
109(g) specifically rather than to § 109 as a whole.").
109. In re Racette, 343 B.R. at 203 ("If an ineligible debtor's petition did not result in a
case, presumably there would be no automatic stay and no need for this stay exception."); In
re Ross, 338 B.R. at 139 ("The enactment of additional exceptions to the automatic stay thus
evidences the understanding of Congress that a filing in violation of § 109(g) commences a
case and results in an automatic stay.").
110. See In re Ross, 338 B.R. at 138 ("BAPCPA's amendments to § 362 confirm that
Congress did not view § 109(g) as being a jurisdictional provision."); In re Tomco, 339 B.R.
at 160 ("The 2005 Act's amendments to Section 362 confirm that Congress did not view §
109 as being jurisdictional.").
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d. Section 301
Courts like the Tomco court that rely on the plain reading of BAPCPA to
determine that petitions filed in violation of section 109(h) commence a
case must address section 301, a provision found under the subchapter
entitled "Commencement of a Case."' 111  Section 301 states that a
bankruptcy case "is commenced by the filing with the bankruptcy court of a
petition.., by an entity that may be a debtor under such chapter.' 1' 2 A
number of courts, concluding that petitions filed in violation of 109(h) do
not commence a case, rely on section 301 as textual support. 13 These
courts stated that because a bankruptcy case is only commenced "by an
entity that may be a debtor" and because section 109(h) provides that an
individual may not be a debtor without obtaining the required credit
counseling, it follows that a person filing in violation of 109(h) may not be
a debtor, and thus, a case cannot commence under section 301.114
However, the Tomco court dismissed this argument with a semantic
discussion of the word "may" as used in section 301.115
It is this Court's view, however, that the word "may" in Section 301 has
an expansive connotation. In ordinary common parlance, the word "may"
as used in the § 301 of the Bankruptcy Code means "might" or is meant to
express a "possibility." The debtor ... [has] the possibility of being a
debtor under the Bankruptcy Code, but he had to obtain the credit
counseling to be certain. 116
This broad definition of the word "may" is not without judicial
support, 117 and was used by the Tomco court to reach its conclusion:
Section 301 provides that a bankruptcy case is commenced by an individual
111. 11 U.S.C.A. § 301 (West 2004 & Supp. 2006); see also id. §§ 302, 303. Section 301
covers individuals voluntarily filing for bankruptcy; section 302 covers individuals filing
jointly for bankruptcy; and section 303 covers involuntary bankruptcies. Because all three
sections provide that a bankruptcy case may only be commenced by or against a person "that
may be a debtor" under title 11, all three sections can be invoked as textual evidence that §
109(h) is jurisdictional in nature. For simplicity and clarity, this Note focuses on section
301. However, sections 302 and 303 could be used as additional support for this argument.
112. Id. § 301(a) (emphasis added).
113. See infra Part II.B.2.a.
114. See infra Part II.B.2.a.
115. In re Tomco, 339 BR. at 159.
116. Id. (citations omitted). But see In re Hawkins, 340 B.R. 642, 646 (Bankr. D.D.C.
2006). The Hawkins court cleverly used the word "might" to challenge the reasoning of the
Tomco court. Id. ("'Congress says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it
says there. . . .' However unpalatable or impractical it might be, the court cannot ignore the
words in the statute before it to achieve a more desirable result, nor can it mangle the
meaning of those words based on what it thinks § 362 might imply." (quoting Conn. Nat'l
Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992)) (citations omitted)).
117. See In re Copper, 314 B.R. 628, 637 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2006) ("Finally, it is also
relevant that § 706(a) uses the word 'may' meaning 'might' or 'used to express possibility'
or 'used to express opportunity or permission.' If Congress had intended to leave the
bankruptcy courts with absolutely no discretion in the matter, it would have used the more
mandatory phrase of 'shall be able to convert.' (citing Random House Unabridged
Dictionary 1189 (2d ed. 1993))).
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who has the potential to be a debtor under section 109. Thus, allowing an
individual who has not received credit counseling to commence a
bankruptcy case does not render section 301 illogical because the individual
had the potential to obtain the counseling.
3. Practical Consequences of Section 109(h) Interpretation
a. The Automatic Stay and Abuse of the Bankruptcy System
The automatic stay gives debtors "one of the most powerful weapons
known to the law."118 As discussed above, 119 when courts determine that
section 109(h) is not jurisdictional, it follows that a petition filed by a
debtor who has not received credit counseling nevertheless commences a
bankruptcy case that gives rise to the protections of the automatic stay
120
until the case is dismissed by the court. Thus, an individual who has not
obtained credit counseling as directed by Congress can still receive an
immediate automatic stay. Courts are therefore "concerned about abuse of
the bankruptcy process through serial filings that repeatedly invoke the
automatic stay, thus improperly frustrating the rights of secured
creditors."'12  Courts striking (rather than dismissing) petitions filed in
violation of 109(h) assert that allowing an individual to commence a case
without having satisfied the 109(h) credit counseling requirement would
allow that same individual to realize the protections of the automatic stay
for an uncertain period of time between the filing of the petition and
dismissal of the case by the court. 122 This situation might promote abuse of
the bankruptcy system by encouraging individuals to make serial filings,
despite being ineligible for relief under 109(h), solely to invoke the
protections of the automatic stay in the face of collection actions by secured
creditors. ' 23
In response to this concern, dismissal courts assert that there is a restraint
on serial filings built into the Code. 124 Section 362(c)(3) states that if an
individual files a second bankruptcy petition and also had a bankruptcy case
pending in the preceding one year period, then the automatic stay in the
second case will terminate after thirty days unless the debtor rebuts the
presumption that the second filing was made in bad faith. 125 Because there
118. In re Russo, 94 B.R. 127, 129 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988); see also H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, Bankruptcy Law Revision, H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 12 (1977) ("[The automatic
stay] is one of the most important protections provided by the bankruptcy laws.").
119. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
120. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(a) (West 2004 & Supp. 2006) for a list of debtor protections
provided by the automatic stay.
121. In re Ross, 338 B.R. 134, 137 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2006).
122. See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
123. In re Seaman, 340 B.R. 698, 708 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2006).
124. Id. at 709.
125. 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(c)(3).
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is a built-in restraint on serial filers, dismissal courts reject this concern
about abuse of the bankruptcy process.
Congress specifically dealt with the effect of serial filings in new §§
362(c)(3) and (4); it did so without regard to eligibility under either prior
or new law. Indeed, when Congress dealt with the interplay of the
automatic stay of § 362 (essentially, a question in the first instance of
jurisdiction) and eligibility under § 109, it dealt only with § 109(g) in a
way that indicates it recognized that the petition of an ineligible debtor
nevertheless commences an effective case over which the bankruptcy
court has jurisdiction.126
A "serial filer" who commences a bankruptcy case without having
satisfied the 109(h) credit counseling requirement solely to stall creditors
with the protections of the automatic stay is not without consequence. If
the "serial filer" files a second bankruptcy petition within the year, there
will be a presumption of bad faith, and the automatic stay will terminate
after thirty days.127
The dismissal courts also reject the argument that the 362(c)(3) bad faith
presumption will unfairly punish individuals who fail, through
misunderstanding or some other good faith reason, to obtain credit
counseling. 128 For example, an individual whose home is scheduled for
foreclosure the next day may file a petition for bankruptcy relief without
knowledge of the credit counseling requirement. According to dismissal
courts, this individual has commenced a case that must be immediately
dismissed for failure to satisfy section 109(h). If the individual then obtains
credit counseling and immediately refiles, he or she must overcome the bad-
faith presumption under section 362(c)(3) or face termination of the
automatic stay after thirty days. 129
But the Ross, Seaman, and Tomco courts, which take a dismissal
approach, were not persuaded that this consequence would adversely affect
such an individual who failed to obtain credit counseling in good faith. 130
[T]he dismissal of a case filed by an ineligible petitioner does not leave a
good-faith debtor without recourse. Such debtors may still access the
'full panoply of protections' [in a second filing] by seeking an extension
of the automatic stay from the court within the first thirty days after the
second case is filed. While there is no doubt that this avenue poses
significant burdens on debtors or others seeking to continue the automatic
stay, it is also apparent that Congress, through this provision, intended
126. In reRoss, 338 B.R. at 139.
127. 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(c)(3).
128. See infra notes 199-202 and accompanying text.
129. 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(c)(3).
130. In re Tomco, 339 B.R. 145, 156, 158 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2006) ("Section 362(c)(3)
concerns are irrelevant to whether this Court should dismiss [the] bankruptcy case.... Had
Congress desired to include in Section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code additional exceptions,
Congress could have done so. Congress, however, did not do so and this Court will not re-
write the statute."); see also In re Seaman, 340 B.R. 698, 709 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2006); In re
Ross, 338 B.R. at 139-40.
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that in appropriate circumstances, a debtor or other party in interest could
move promptly to reinstate the protections of the automatic stay. The
reinstatement of the automatic stay, not the remedy of striking the
petition, appears to be the answer provided by BAPCPA to the question
of how a petitioner who files a bankruptcy case without satisfying the
credit counseling requirement may gain access to the full benefits of thebankruptcy system. I3I
The Seaman court declared that courts should not strike petitions filed in
violation of 109(h) in an effort to protect good faith petitioners from the
section 362(c)(3) bad faith presumption because Congress gives these
petitioners the right to prove to the court that the second filing is in good
faith. 132
The Ross court further noted that courts which seek to protect an
ineligible debtor's rights in a second filing by striking the petition as
opposed to dismissing the case will often have precisely the opposite
effect. 133 Striking the petition means that no case is commenced. As the
Ross court pointed out (and some striking courts agree), 134 if no case is
commenced there is no automatic stay imposed by the filing of the petition,
which means creditors can foreclose on secured property.' 35 Therefore,
courts seeking to protect petitioners by striking the petition of an individual
ineligible under section 109(h) will often cause significant harm. The fact
that bankruptcy relief may be limited in a second filing is of little
consequence to an individual who failed to obtain credit counseling and had
his or her home foreclosed because no automatic stay was imposed after the
first inadequate filing.136
b. Uncertainty and the Automatic Stay
Finally, dismissal courts note that substantial uncertainty and confusion
would plague creditors as a result of striking petitions filed in violation of
131. In re Seaman, 340 B.R. at 709 (citation omitted).
132. Id.; see also In re Racette, 343 B.R. 200, 204 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2006) ("[B]eing
required to file a motion to seek to continue the stay under § 362(c)(3) in their new case may
be an appropriate price to pay for the Debtors' apparent carelessness in reviewing their
bankruptcy petition .... ").
133. In re Ross 338 B.R. at 139-40 ("To be sure, dismissing the case as void ab initio
keeps the case from counting as a prior pending case for purposes of § 362(c)'s limitations
on stays in successive cases. But such 'protection' will be a pyrrhic victory if, in the
meantime, a creditor has completed a repossession or foreclosure because of the absence of a
stay in the void case. Although courts might hope that creditors will wait for a judicial
determination of ineligibility before exercising their remedies, a creditor may decide to rely
on its own review of the record concerning eligibility or, more likely, may have completed a
foreclosure without knowledge that the bankruptcy case was filed. If an ineligible debtor's
case is void ab initio, a debtor in such circumstances will have no protection at all with
regard to foreclosed assets in a later case." (citations omitted)).
134. See infra notes 187-94 and accompanying text.
135. See In reRoss, 338 B.R. at 138-39.
136. See id.
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109(h), as opposed to dismissing the case. 137 As discussed above, under the
striking method there would be no automatic stay protection following the
filing of a petition by a debtor who has not received credit counseling.' 38
But courts will not immediately strike an inadequate petition the moment it
is filed with the clerk. Until the court determines that the individual is
ineligible and strikes the petition, creditors will not know whether the
individual is protected by the automatic stay. 139 This uncertainty will
extend to questions of "validity of an action against property taken by a
creditor of a petitioner who appears ineligible to be a debtor but later is
determined to be eligible."' 140 In short, the striking of an ineligible petition
leads to a host of "uncertainty" problems for creditors and other parties in
interest. 141 Striking petitions would force courts to constantly address the
validity of creditor and debtor actions taken after the filing of the petition
but before a determination of eligibility. 142 By reading section 109(h) as
non-jurisdictional, on the other hand, dismissal courts permit a debtor who
has not obtained credit counseling to commence a bankruptcy case and
invoke the automatic stay. Thus, both the debtor and the creditors can be
certain that the automatic stay is in effect when an individual files a
bankruptcy petition, regardless of whether the individual has satisfied the
109(h) credit counseling requirement. 143 If the court determines that the
individual is ineligible under 109(h), the court will dismiss the case and the
automatic stay will be lifted. For this reason, dismissal courts assert that
reading 109(h) as non-jurisdictional is the best reading of the statute
because certainty is provided to both debtors and creditors.
B. A Bankruptcy Petition Filed in Violation of 109(h) Does Not Commence
a "Case" and the Proper Remedy Is to Strike the Petition
Rather than dismissing the bankruptcy case of an individual ineligible for
bankruptcy under section 109(h), a number of courts ("striking courts")
hold that the proper remedy is to strike the petition. 144 While these courts
disagree on whether to label section 109(h) as jurisdictional in nature, 145
137. See id. at 140; see also In re Racette, 343 B.R. at 203; In re Seaman, 340 B.R. at
707; In re Tomco, 339 B.R. 145, 159 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2006).
138. See supra note 134; see also infra notes 192-99 and accompanying text.
139. In reRoss, 338 BR. at 140.
140. In re Seaman, 340 B.R. at 707.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 707-08.
144. See, e.g., In re Elmendorf, 345 B.R. 486 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006); In re Thompson,
344 B.R. 899 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 2006); In re Carey, 341 B.R. 798 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2006); In
re Salazar, 339 B.R. 622 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2006); In re Sosa, 336 B.R. 113 (Bankr. W.D.
Tex. 2005); In re Rios, 336 B.R. 177 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005); In re Valdez, 335 B.R. 801
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2005); In re Hubbard, 333 B.R. 377 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005).
145. For example, in In re Valdez, the court stated that it "views the criteria established
by 11 U.S.C. § 109 as jurisdictional." 335 BR. at 803. However, other striking courts do not
view the failure to obtain credit counseling in accordance with section 109(h) as a definitivejurisdictional bar to bankruptcy relief. As one striking court has noted, "Every federal court
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they all agree that the failure to satisfy the 109(h) credit counseling
requirement means that no case is commenced, which means that there is no
case to dismiss, and the petition must be stricken.
1. Prior Interpretations of the Bankruptcy Code
a. Pre-BAPCPA Jurisprudence with Regard Section 109(g)
The In re Salazar court addressed the contention that pre-BAPCPA
interpretations of section 109(g) require a determination that the 109(h)
credit counseling provision is non-jurisdictional in nature. 146 While noting
that the In re Flores court read section 109(g) as non-jurisdictional, 147 the
Salazar court observed that other courts disagree. 148 This conflict in pre-
BAPCPA 109(g) jurisprudence led the Salazar court to conclude that
"regardless of one's view on § 109(h), § 109(g)'s treatment in case law
cannot be entirely instructive." 149
necessarily has the jurisdiction to determine whether it has subject matter jurisdiction over
the case or controversy before it." In re Hawkins, 340 B.R. 642, 646 (Bankr. D.D.C. 2006).
Another striking court- the Elmendorf court, emphasized the distinction between viewing
Section 109(h) as a jurisdictional bar to bankruptcy and viewing 109(h) as an eligibility
requirement which determines whether a case is commenced:
The Court interprets [28 U.S.C.] § 1334(a) to encompass cases filed and pending
before the Court even if not properly commenced by the filing-that is, cases
initiated by potentially ineligible debtors-until such time as the Court is able to
determine its jurisdiction over those filings. On the other hand, a case under title
11 isn't commenced until a petition is filed by a party eligible to be a debtor.
In re Elmendorf, 345 B.R. at 499. By applying this interpretation to 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a), the
Elmendorf court effectively negated the jurisdictional argument set forth in In re Tomco, 339
B.R. 145, 159 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2006). See supra Part II.A.2.a. Contrary to the Elmendorf
court, the Hawkins court reads a narrower interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1334 to assert that
Section 109(h) is jurisdictional:
A title 11 case must commence for a court to assert jurisdiction under § 1334....
[Section] 301 of the Bankruptcy Code sets forth the only basis for commencing a
case under title 11 .... an individual who fails to obtain pre-petition credit
counseling of the kind described in § 109(h) 'may not be a debtor under this title.'
Ergo, a petition filed by an individual who has failed to obtain pre-petition credit
counseling does not 'commence[]' a title 11 case, which means that there is no
case conferring subject matter jurisdiction on the district court or on the
bankruptcy court through a referral of jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157.
In re Hawkins, 340 B.R. at 645 (citing 11 U.S.C.A. § 109(h) (West 2004 & Supp. 2006)).
146. In re Salazar, 339 B.R. at 631-32. For a discussion of the argument that pre-
BAPCPA jurisprudence with regards to Section 109(g) demands a reading that section
109(h) is jurisdictional, see supra Part II.A. .a.
147. In re Flores, 291 B.R. 44 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003); see also supra notes 75-80 and
accompanying text.
148. In re Salazar, 339 B.R. at 631 (citing In re McKay, 268 B.R. 908, 912 (Bankr. W.D.
Va. 2001)); In re Pelletier, No. 00-81949 C-13, 2000 WL 33673780 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Sept.
7, 2000)); In re Hollberg, 208 B.R. 755, 756 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1997); In re Prud'Homme, 161
B.R. 747, 751 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1993); In re Walker, 171 B.R. 197, 202 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1994); In re Miller, 143 B.R. 815, 820 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1992).
149. In re Salazar, 339 B.R. at 632.
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Furthermore, the In re Thompson court pointed out that prior to the
enactment of the new section 362(c)(3) bad faith presumption in BAPCPA,
it made little difference whether the petition of an individual ineligible for
relief under section 109(g) was dismissed or stricken. 150 Prior to the new
362(c)(3) provision, the termination of a case did not affect an individual's
ability to trigger the full advantages of the automatic stay in a subsequent
case. 151 Indeed, whether a case was dismissed or stricken under pre-
BAPCPA section 109(g) was a "difference without a distinction.' 52 For
this reason, the Thompson court cautioned against using section 109(g) case
law as an interpretive guide to section 109(h) because "with [BAPCPA's]
addition of § 362(c)(3) ... a distinction exists."' 53
2. Plain Reading of the Statute
a. Section 301
The courts that determine to strike (rather than dismiss) petitions filed in
violation of section 109(h) unanimously draw their textual evidence from
section 301.154 Section 301 states that a case "is commenced by the filing
with the bankruptcy court of a petition.., by an entity that may be a debtor
under such chapter." 155 The Thompson court stated that "[t]he phrase 'an
entity that may be a debtor' ... qualifies 'petition' and that only those
petitions filed by those eligible to be debtors 'under such chapter' can
'commence' a 'case."' 1 56 In order to determine "those debtors eligible to
be debtors," one must look to section 109, which is entitled "Who may be a
150. In re Thompson, 344 B.R. 899, 904 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 2006); see also In re Salazar,
339 B.R. at 633.
151. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(c)(3) (West 2004 & Supp. 2006); see also supra notes 61-64
and accompanying text.
152. In re Salazar, 339 B.R. at 633.
153. In re Thompson, 344 B.R. at 904. The Thompson court also noted other situations
that lead to striking rather than dismissal:
[T]his court has interpreted other rules which has led to the "striking" of a
complaint rather than the dismissal of a case. [The local District Court rules
provide] that "[a] civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court."
When this Court determines that an attorney not admitted to practice before the
courts of this District has filed a complaint to "commence" a civil action, this
Court strikes the complaint because the attorney is ineligible to "commence" a
case in this District.
Id. at 905.
154. See, e.g., In re Elmendorf, 345 B.R. 486, 495-99, 501-02 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006); In
re Thompson, 344 B.R. at 905; In re Carey, 341 B.R. 798, 804 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2006); In
re Salazar, 339 B.R. at 625-26; In re Hubbard, 333 B.R. 377, 388 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005).
For simplicity and clarity, this Note focuses on section 301. However, sections 302 and 303
could be used as additional support for this argument. See supra notes 111-16 and
accompanying text.
155. 11 U.S.C.A. § 301; see also id. §§ 302-03.
156. In re Thompson, 344 B.R. at 905 (quoting 11 U.S.C.A. § 301). "Here, [the court's]
reading of §§ 301 and 302 leads [it] to conclude that the 'filing of a petition' is not
synonymous with 'the commencement of a case."' Id.
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debtor."' 157 Section 109 requires an individual to receive credit counseling
in order to be an eligible debtor.'58 If someone files a petition without
satisfying section 109(h), he or she is not eligible to be a debtor and,
according to a plain reading of section 301, no case is commenced.' 5 9
Allowing individuals who fail to qualify as an "eligible debtor" to
nonetheless commence a bankruptcy case "renders a straightforward
reading of Sections 109(h), 301, 302, 303 and 362(a) irrational."'160
b. Section 707
Section 707 of BAPCPA outlines circumstances under which a court may
dismiss an individual consumer bankruptcy case. 161 The failure to seek
credit counseling as required under section 109(h) is noticeably absent from
the list. In In re Rios, the court relied on this absence as evidence that
Congress did not intend the petitions of debtors ineligible under section
109(h) to commence a case. 162
The Court thinks that dismissal [of a case] for failure to seek credit
counseling achieves a result Congress intended to avoid; that is, future
limitation of debtor protection under the BAPCPA. Indeed, Congress
could have made failure to seek credit-counseling cause for dismissal
under the revised 11 U.S.C. § 707, but did not. In enacting § 109(h)(1),
Congress sought to enlarge debtors' options in the face of financial
difficulty, not limit them. Congress intended that debtors would inform
themselves of their options prior to bankruptcy filing by participating in
credit counseling, and if bankruptcy continued to be the best option,
debtors could avail themselves of that alternative. It is therefore apparent
that Congress did not intend the credit-counseling requirement to limit the
157. 11 U.S.C.A. § 109.
158. Id. § 109(h).
159. In re Salazar, 339 B.R. at 625-26; see also Robert Lefkowitz, The Filing of a
Bankruptcy Petition in Violation of]] U.S.C. § 109(g): Does it Invoke the Automatic Stay?,
26 Cardozo L. Rev. 297, 315 (2004) ("Only entities who meet the eligibility requirements of
§ 109 may 'commence' a case. An entity that does not meet the requirements of § 109 may
not be a debtor and thus cannot 'commence' a case. Any document labeled 'petition' filed
by such an entity does not constitute a 'petition' as defined by the Bankruptcy Code....
Therefore, the court prevents [the petitioner] from commencing the case .... ").
160. In re Elmendorf, 345 B.R. at 501; see also King v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 502 U.S.
215, 221 (1991) ("[T]he cardinal rule [is] that a statute is to be read as a whole.., since the
meaning of statutory language, plain or not, depends on context."); Consumer Prod. Safety
Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980) ("Absent a clearly expressed
legislative intention to the contrary, [statutory language] must ordinarily be regarded as
conclusive."); United States v. Hartwell, 73 U.S. 385, 396 (1867) ("The proper course in all
cases is to adopt that sense of the words which best harmonizes with the context, and
promotes in the fullest manner the policy and objects of the legislature. The rule of strict
construction is not violated by permitting the words of the statute to have their full meaning,
or the more extended of two meanings, as the wider popular instead of the more narrow
technical one; but the words should be taken in such a sense, bent neither one way nor the
other, as will best manifest the legislative intent.").
161. 11 U.S.C.A. § 707.
162. In re Rios, 336 B.R. 177, 180 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 2005).
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availability or extent of bankruptcy relief for debtors, which dismissal
would accomplish, and thus, dismissal is inappropriate.... [T]he
bankruptcy case was never properly commenced and is therefore
stricken. 163
The Rios court effectively extended section 707 from mere textual
support for the conclusion that an individual who has not obtained credit
counseling cannot commence a case, to evidence of a purposeful,
congressional intent to avoid such an interpretation.
c. Section 521
The striking courts also cite section 521 64 of BAPCPA for evidence that
the filing of an ineligible petition should not result in dismissal of a case. 165
Section 521 includes a list of documents that a debtor must file with the
court 166 as well as matters that would render a case so deficient that it
would be "automatically dismissed."'167 Although the debtor is required to
file a certificate of credit counseling under section 521(b)(l), 168 failure to
file this certificate is not itself listed as a basis for automatic dismissal of
the case. 169 The Salazar court concluded that "[s]ince failure to obtain
credit counseling is not a basis for dismissal, the only alternative is to find
that no case was commenced by the filing of a petition by an ineligible
person."1 70
d. The Surplusage Argument: Section 362(b)(21)(A)
The striking courts address the "surplusage" argument raised by the
dismissal courts under section 362(b)(21)(A).171  The "surplusage"
argument notes that section 362(b)(21)(A), which denies the automatic stay
to debtors ineligible under section 109(g), does not expressly deny the
protection to individuals ineligible under other sub-provisions of section
109. The dismissal courts infer that individuals ineligible under section
109(h) are protected by the automatic stay, and that a case therefore must
163. Id.
164. 11 U.S.C.A. § 521.
165. In re Elmendorf, 345 B.R. at 502; In re Salazar, 339 B.R. at 630.
166. 11 U.S.C.A. § 521.
167. Id. § 521(i).
168. Id. § 521(b)(1).
169. The failure to submit a credit counseling certificate as required under § 521(b)(1) is
not listed as a cause for automatic dismissal under § 521(i). See id. § § 521 (b)(1), (i).
170. In re Salazar, 339 B.R. at 630; see In re Elmendorf, 345 B.R. at 502 ("Congress
could have, but did not, include a credit counseling certificate as among those documents to
be filed pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 52 1(a) by debtor to avoid automatic dismissal pursuant to §
521(i)(1)."); see also In re Thompson, 344 B.R. 899, 903 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 2006) ("By
placing the credit counseling requirements under § 109 (the 'who can be a debtor' section)
rather than § 521 (the 'Debtor's duties' section, enumerating the documents required to be
filed and the actions required to be taken by the debtor), debtors now have an immediate
eligibility threshold to cross.").
171. See supra Part II.A.2.c.
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commence despite failure to receive credit counseling. 172 Dismissal courts
contend that any other interpretation would render the statute
superfluous. 173
The Elmendorf court rejected the "surplusage" argument by insisting that
section 362(b)(21)(A) applies uniquely to section 109(g). The court noted
that where "ineligibility is incurable, no stay is created by the bankruptcy
filing,"' 174 and then observed that ineligibility under section 109(g) can be
cured by a "showing of changed circumstances or other good cause."175
Because 109(g) ineligibility can be cured, the court would exercise
jurisdiction over the matter until section 109(g) eligibility can be
established, 176 and the automatic stay would apply during this time. The
Elmendorf court concluded that the purpose of section 362(b)(21)(A) is to
deny the automatic stay under certain circumstances arising under section
109(g). 177 Section 109(h) ineligibility, on the other hand, is incurable. 178
Because it is incurable, there is no time gap between the filing of a petition
and the fundamental fact of ineligibility; an individual is either eligible
under section 109(h) when they file, or they are not.179 Because there is no
time gap, the automatic stay does not come into effect and there is no need
to create an exception to the automatic stay with regard to section 109(h).180
Thus, section 362(b)(21)(A) is not left superfluous by this interpretation.
Finding that a petition filed in violation of 109(h) does not commence a
case does not render the 362(b)(21)(A) provision a nullity. 181
The Salazar court also avoided the section 362(b)(21)(A) "superfluous"
pitfall, but took a slightly different path. The court reflected on the
relationship between case law and the legislative process to conclude that
172. See supra note 103 and accompanying text. For a holding that the automatic stay
can be invoked even when no case is commenced, see In re Thompson, 344 B.R. 899; In re
Hawkins, 340 B.R. 642, 645 (Bankr. D.D.C. 2006) ("[T]here is nothing in § 362 as amended
by Congress that contradicts directly the plain language of 28 U.S.C. § 1334 and § 301 of the
Bankruptcy Code, which set forth the statutory framework for the district court's jurisdiction
over bankruptcy cases."); infra notes 212-15 and accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
174. In re Elmendorf, 345 B.R. at 499.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 499-500.
177. Id. at 499.
178. Id. at 500 ("Congress intended for debtors to seek credit counseling prior to filing
for bankruptcy relief, so that bankruptcy may be avoided altogether if possible, through, for
example, an alternate debt repayment plan.").
179. Id. "Thus, the non-compliant individual who does not obtain credit counseling is
ineligible to enjoy the benefits of the Bankruptcy Code. Credit counseling is an absolute
pre-requisite to individual bankruptcy eligibility." Id. at 495.
180. Id. at 500.
181. Id. "Congress obviously intended Section 109(h) ineligibility to have a preclusive
effect; there was no need to provide an exception to the automatic stay for ineligible
individuals by virtue of § 109(h) because no case is commenced by a bankruptcy filing in
that regard; and no stay invoked thereby." Id. at 502. But see In re Wallert, 332 B.R. 884
(Bankr. D. Minn. 2005). The Wallert court agreed that the 109(h) eligibility requirement is
an incurable defect in a petition, but unlike the Elmendorf court, uses this incurability as
support for dismissing a case. Id. at 888.
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Congress adopted 362(b)(21)(A) with the intent legislatively to override
courts that were misapplying section 109(g).182 The court observed that,
prior to BAPCPA, some courts had concluded that filings in violation of
109(g) did not commence a case, while others had found that such filings
invoked the automatic stay which remains in place until a judicial
determination of 109(g) eligibility.' 83  For this reason, "the apparent
legislative intent [of 362(b)(21)(A)] was to overrule court decisions that
were at odds with the statute as previously drafted. Accordingly, section
362(b)(21) was not surplusage-it implemented a legislative intent to
eliminate any court-perceived ambiguity."' 184 Section 362(b)(21)(A) is
intended to address 109(g) without regard to any other sub-provisions of
section 109.185 The Salazar court reinforced this argument by stating that
"even if the language were treated as surplusage, the Court should not give
meaning to surplusage if doing so would be demonstrably at odds with
legislative intent." 186
3. Practical Consequences of Section 109(h) Interpretation
a. The Automatic Stay and Abuse of the Bankruptcy System
Unlike dismissal courts, the Elmendorf court held that a petition filed in
violation of 109(h) does not invoke the automatic stay. 187 This conclusion
was based on a "straightforward reading"' 88 of section 362(a). 189 The
court's reasoning hinged on the following argument: Section 362(a)
imposes the automatic stay when "a petition [is] filed under section 301 ."190
Section 301 refers to the filing of a petition by an individual "that may be a
182. In re Salazar, 339 B.R. 622, 632 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2006).
183. Id. at 631-32.
184. Id. at 632.
185. See id; see also In re Hawkins, 340 B.R. 642, 645 (Bankr. D.D.C. 2006) ("There are
many reasons why Congress might have amended § 362 in the way that it did. Congress
may have focused on § 109(g) because courts were split with respect to the effect of that
specific sub-part of the statute at the time of the congressional amendment. In other words,
it may be the case that § 109(g)-and only § 109(g)-was on Congress' mind when it
revised § 362. It is therefore no mystery why Congress would amend § 362 to refer to §
109(g) specifically rather than to § 109 as a whole.").
186. In re Salazar, 339 B.R. at 632 (citing Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 536 (2004)).
But see U.S. v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955) ("It is our duty 'to give effect, if
possible, to every clause and word of a statute."' (quoting Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S.
147, 152 (1883))).
187. In re Elmendorf, 345 B.R. 486, 498 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006). But see supra notes
102-03 and accompanying text.
188. In re Elmendorf 345 B.R. at 498 (citing Lamie, 540 U.S. at 534 ("[W]hen a statute's
language is plain, the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms, at
least where the disposition required by the text is not absurd, even if the statute is phrased
awkwardly or ungrammatically.")).
189. 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(a) (West 2004 & Supp. 2006).
190. Id. § 362(a).
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debtor."' 191 An individual that "may be a debtor" must have satisfied the
109(h) credit counseling requirement.' 92 Thus, "[s]ections 109(h), 301,
302, and 362(a), which when read to [sic] together.., lead to the logical
result that the filing of a petition without first obtaining a credit briefing as
required by 11 U.S.C. § 109(h) renders a debtor ineligible for bankruptcy
relief and does not trigger the protections of the automatic stay."1 93 To hold
otherwise, the court contended, would be wholly at odds with the
congressional intent of BAPCPA. 194
The Elmendorf court further asserted that dismissal courts will promote
abuse of the bankruptcy system by allowing a debtor ineligible under
109(h) to enjoy the protections of the automatic stay. 195 Individuals with
no intention of reorganizing could temporarily invoke the protections of the
automatic stay to forestall secured creditors and delay matters, at least until
a court determines that they are ineligible. 196 These individuals could file
at the last minute without credit counseling and then "sit back and do
virtually nothing, secure in the knowledge that creditors may not proceed
until dismissal.., enjoying the delay that such action will involve."'1 97 The
idea of ineligible debtors maintaining such easy access to the automatic stay
prompted the Salazar court to state that "[i]t is implausible to believe that
Congress specifically identified people to exclude from the bankruptcy
process, yet permitted those same people to benefit from bankruptcy's most
powerful protection."1 98  Allowing an individual who has not obtained
credit counseling to commence a case is intolerable as it would allow
abusive debtors to access the automatic stay.
b. The Penalty: Section 362(c)(3)
The striking courts note that striking the petition of a debtor who has not
received credit counseling, as opposed to dismissing the case, also avoids
the consequence of section 362(c)(3). 199 Section 362(c)(3) provides that
the second filing by an individual within one year of a pending bankruptcy
case is presumed to be in bad faith so that the automatic stay in the second
filing will terminate after thirty days unless the individual can rebut the bad
faith presumption.200 Given this limitation on future bankruptcy relief,
courts are concerned about the honest and ignorant person who files for
191. Id. § 301.
192. Id. § 109(h).
193. In reElmendorf, 345 B.R. at 501.
194. Id. at 501-02 ("The Court will not discount obvious Congressional intent in enacting
Section 109(h)--that incurably ineligible debtors [under section 109(h)] not be permitted to
enjoy the protections of the automatic stay.").
195. Id. at 500-01, 504.
196. Id. at 501.
197. Id. at 504.
198. In re Salazar, 339 B.R. 622, 624 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2006) (emphasis omitted).
199. 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(c)(3) (West 2004 & Supp. 2006); see also supra notes 62-64 and
accompanying text.
200. 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(c)(3).
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desperately needed bankruptcy relief without first obtaining credit
counseling.201 These petitioners often file as a result of serious or fatal
illness, the loss of a job, or divorce. 20 2 This concern prompted the Rios
court to declare that "Congress did not intend the credit-counseling
requirement to limit the availability or extent of bankruptcy relief for
debtors [who fail to obtain credit counseling], which dismissal would
accomplish, and thus, dismissal is inappropriate. ' '20 3
c. Uncertainty and the Automatic Stay
Striking courts holding that petitions filed in violation of 109(h) do not
give rise to the automatic stay recognize that an element of uncertainty is
infused into the bankruptcy process. 204 Because the petition will not be
immediately stricken when filed with the clerk, there is a period of
uncertainty between the filing of the petition and a judicial determination of
201. Professor Susan Block-Lieb has questioned whether a "debtor protection" such as
the 109(h) credit counseling provision as labeled by Congress, with harsh penalties, such as
the 362(c)(3) bad faith presumption in a second filing, is in fact a veiled debtor punishment.
See Susan Block-Lieb, Mandatory Protections as Veiled Punishments: Debtor Education in
H.R. 975, The Bankruptcy Abuse and Consumer Protection Act of 2003, 69 Brook. L. Rev.
425, 427 (2004).
202. See supra note 39 and accompanying text; see also In re Elmendorf, 345 B.R. at 494;
In re Valdez, 335 B.R. 801, 803 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2005) ("Is it the intent of Congress that
poor, ignorant persons who do not know the law and cannot afford to obtain the advice of
counsel are to be denied protection and assistance of the Bankruptcy Code which is available
to more affluent and better educated persons? Or, is it the intent of Congress that decent,
honest, hardworking persons, who have suffered financial misfortune or tragedy, be educated
by budget and credit counseling services to help them determine if there is a more
appropriate way to deal with their financial problems? Sadly, the language in the Code does
not clearly reveal Congress' intent; either the Code language was inartfully drafted or the
congressional intent was indeed the former less compassionate, harsher result, rather than the
latter.").
203. In re Rios, 336 B.R. 177, 180 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005). But see In re Salazar, 339
B.R. at 626 ("[Tlhere is no room for an equitable exception to the application of the
statute."); In re Tomco, 339 B.R. 145, 152 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2006). The Tomco court,
concluding that petitions filed in violation of 109(h) commence a case and should be
dismissed, did not ignore the good faith debtor in reaching its decision:
This Court, as well as others, recognize that consumer debtors facing eviction or
mortgage foreclosure are not meeting with lawyers trying to figure out what to do
well in advance before they file for bankruptcy relief.... The debtor usually is
either pounding the pavement in an attempt to refinance existing debt so that
monthly payments can be made more affordable .... [T]he average consumer
debtor devotes most of his or her time and effort attempting to accumulate the
needed funds to become current with creditors. As the consumer is in dire financial
straights, the debtor has little or no disposable income for counsel because the
debtor is using what little funds he or she has to pay for family expenses such as
housing, utilities, groceries, and clothing.
Id. But the court noted that the proper remedy for such good faith and unfortunate debtors
was not to have their petitions stricken, but to file a certificate of exigent circumstances as
required by section 109(g). Id. at 153; see also supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
204. In re Salazar, 339 B.R. at 627 (citing In re Ross, 338 B.R. 134, 140-41 (Bankr. N.D.
Ga. 2006)).
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eligibility.205 Creditors who move to collect on secured collateral during
this ambiguous period may face repercussions if it is later determined that
the petitioner is in fact eligible and thus was protected from collection
actions through the automatic stay after filing the petition.206 As noted,
dismissal courts cite this uncertainty as support for allowing ineligible
petitioners to commence a case so that all parties can be certain that the
automatic stay is in effect. 207 But the Salazar court recognized the potential
confusion and concluded that "the Court is unaware of any reason that
precludes Congress from creating a level of uncertainty pending a final
determination by the Court. '208 Indeed, there are a number of examples
where actions are subject to substantial uncertainty until a final decision is
reached.20 9 The Salazar court continued to articulate its skepticism of the
uncertainty argument:
Such a proliferation of exceptions to the automatic stay further indicates
Congressional intent to promote specific policies ....
In other words, the Court sees no reason why certainty must trump
policy. Congress has decided to establish new eligibility requirements
under BAPCPA. If this Court were to determine that certainty overrides
that intent, the Court would be reaching a decision that Congress was not
free to change the paradigms under which bankruptcy law operates. The
Court declines to make such a decision. Certainty versus policy is a
decision that balances social policy with economics. A decision with
respect to such matters is left to Congress alone. 2 10
205. Creditors could conceivably undertake their own investigations of petitioners to
determine if an individual had satisfied the credit counseling requirement. However, this
would seem to be a costly and inefficient tool for minimizing the risk of violating the
automatic stay.
206. In re Salazar, 339 B.R. at 626-27.
207. See supra Part II.A.3.b. But see In re Hawkins, 340 B.R. 642, 646 n.7 (Bankr.
D.D.C. 2006) ("Numerous courts that have declared § 109 to be 'non-jurisdictional' have
mentioned the supposedly inequitable and impractical results that will obtain if debtor
eligibility is treated as a prerequisite to subject matter jurisdiction. These courts make very
good arguments for why district and bankruptcy courts should be able to assert subject
matter jurisdiction even when the purported debtor is ineligible under § 109, but they are
irrelevant in deciding whether the court actually has jurisdiction in such circumstances under
the Bankruptcy Code as it is currently written. The court cannot simply will itself to have
whatever jurisdiction it thinks is appropriate to carry out its functions; the source of its
jurisdiction comes from Congress and from Congress alone." (citations omitted)).
208. In re Salazar, 339 BR. at 627.
209. Id. at 627-28 (citing Bemal v. Chavez, 198 S.W.3d 15 (Tex. App. 2006) (holding
that title to real estate may be subsumed by adverse possession)); see also 11 U.S.C.A. §
547(b) (West 2004 & Supp. 2006) (governing preferences and fraudulent transfers); U.S. v.
McDermott, 507 U.S. 447 (1993) (holding that the federal government may claim an
unrecorded, inchoate tax lien on acquired property for unpaid federal income taxes); In re
Gandy, 327 B.R. 796 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005) (holding that the automatic stay is not
applicable to actions by a governmental unit to enforce its police powers, but the decision on
the applicability of the stay may require judicial determination).
210. In re Salazar, 339 B.R. at 628-29; see also Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 594
(1989) ("Our task is to interpret the statute as best we can, not to second-guess the wisdom
of the congressional policy choice."); Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 526 (1987)
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Thus, the Salazar court dismissed the uncertainty argument by pointing
its finger at Congress. However, the Salazar court also invoked the idea of
uncertainty as support for the striking method by warning of the dangers
that could result from misunderstandings about an individual's bankruptcy
petition. 211
The Thompson court avoided the uncertainty dilemma by actually
imposing the automatic stay until the court strikes the petition filed in
violation of 109(h). The court's primary reasoning for this argument was
that the "'commencement' of the case is [not] the exclusive prerequisite for
the imposition of the automatic stay." 212 The court looked to section 362(a)
of the Code which provides, "a petition filed under section 301 ... operates
as a stay" 213 and noted that section 301 "allow[s] for petitions to be filed by
ineligible debtors, they just don't allow cases to be commenced by petitions
filed by ineligible debtors. '2 14 Thus, the event triggering the automatic stay
is the filing of a petition, not the commencement of a case; whether an
ineligible petition is stricken or dismissed is irrelevant for purposes of the
automatic stay.215 Under this theory, there will be minimal confusion when
a petition is filed because creditors can be certain their interests are
protected by the automatic stay even if the individual did not receive credit
counseling and their petition is later stricken. By imposing the automatic
stay and striking petitions filed in violation of 109(h), the Thompson court
effectively resolved the uncertainty concerns advanced by the dismissal
courts.
2 16
("Deciding what competing values will or will not be sacrificed to the achievement of a
particular objective is the very essence of legislative choice .... ").
211. In re Salazar, 339 B.R. at 632 n.5 ("The clerk, of course, accepts papers that are
presented without a merits review. [Allowing a debtor who fails to obtain credit counseling
to commence a case] would allow an individual to title any piece of paper a 'petition' and to
give it the same legal significance as one filed in accordance with [the Code]. To accept that
argument is to invite havoc. What if the document was filed fraudulently? What if the text
of the document indicated that the 'petition' was a 'petition for a grievance' against some
unjust act by the government, mistakenly filed with the bankruptcy clerk? ... To attribute
legal significance to misnomered documents (i.e., those filed not by someone eligible to be a
debtor) is to remove the meaning of the statute.").
212. In re Thompson, 344 B.R. 899, 906 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 2006).
213. 11 U.S.C § 362(a) (2000).
214. In re Thompson, 344 B.R. at 906.
215. Id.; see also Posting of David L. Rosendorf to ABI's BAPCPA Blog,
http:/ibapcpa.blogspot.com/2006 04 01_bapcpa archive.html, You Say Strike It, I Say
Dismiss It-What Happens When an Ineligible Debtor Files (Apr. 18, 2006, 05:50 EST).
216. See supra Part II.A.3.b. The Thompson court further strengthened its conclusion that
striking ineligible petitions and imposing the automatic stay are not mutually exclusive by
looking, as so many other courts do in a section 109(h) analysis, to the new 362(b)(21)(A)
provision. The court agreed that section 362(b)(21)(A) must be read to conclude that
petitions filed in violation of 109(h) give rise to the automatic stay. In re Thompson, 344
B.R. at 907. The court stated,
This amendment recognizes the different treatment to be afforded a debtor
ineligible under § 109(g), who, by definition is, a repeat filer, and a debtor
ineligible under § 109(h), whose ineligibility was caused by the failure to perform
the ministerial act of obtaining credit counseling. This Court has found that the
vast majority of debtors who are ineligible under § 109(h) are pro se debtors who
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C. A Third Way?
While the majority of courts remain committed to either striking petitions
or dismissing cases, the Elmendorf court, which struck a petition filed in.
violation of 109(h), added a slightly different alternative.2 17
Acknowledging the potential abuse and confusion that could result from
striking petitions,2 18 Elmendorf concluded that in addition to simply striking
ineligible petitions, the court may also strike petitions with a prejudice to
future filings.2 19
In Elmendorf the court was presented with three individuals who failed
to satisfy the 109(h) credit counseling requirement. 220 Besides failing to
obtain credit counseling, however, the individuals had little in common.
The first petitioner, Lena Elmendorf, had never before filed for bankruptcy
and had relied on counsel to file her case. 22 1 The second petitioner, Diana
Finlay, had previously engaged in a series of bankruptcy filings in an
attempt to forestall secured creditors from exercising collection rights.222
The third petitioner, Shayna Zarnel, was the wife of a man who had
repeatedly filed to forestall a secured creditor's foreclosure on real
property-and was now apparently filing for the same reason.2 23  This
situation prompted the court to state that "[g]iven their particular
circumstances ... [t]he appropriate outcome, if requested, is to allow these
debtors to be treated differently in accordance with their
circumstances .... ,"224 The court determined that, depending on the factors
surrounding each petitioner, it could either strike petitions, which would not
limit the benefits available in a future bankruptcy filing,225 or strike the
petition with prejudice to future filings, which would limit future
bankruptcy benefits. 22 6 The court based this solution on section 105(a) of
BAPCPA22 7 and judicial docket management powers.
Section 105(a) provides that "[t]he court may issue any order, process, or
judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this
title. No provision of this title... shall be construed to preclude the court
from.., taking any action or making any determination necessary... to
prevent an abuse of process."22 8 The Elmendorf court viewed this provision
are neither serial filers nor aware that they must seek or attempt to seek credit
counseling before they file.
Id. at 907 n.14; see also supra Part II.A.2.c.
217. In re Elmendorf, 345 B.R. 486, 504 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006).
218. See supra Part II.B.3.c.
219. In reElmendorf 345 B.R. at 504.
220. Id. at 491-93.
221. Id. at 491.
222. Id. at 492.
223. Id. at 492-93.
224. Id. at 493-94.
225. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(c)(3) (West 2004 & Supp. 2006).
226. In re Elmendorf, 345 B.R. at 504.
227. See id. at 503-04; see also 11 IU.S.C.A. § 105(a).
228. 11 U.S.C.A. § 105(a).
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as evidence that, although a court should strike petitions, it has the power to
fashion a remedy that will preclude abusive debtors, such as Diana Finlay,
from future bankruptcy relief.229 When this power was challenged by the
- U.S. Trustee because the striking of a petition is not explicitly provided for
in BAPCPA, the court relied on its docket management powers.230 "The
action of striking a [petition] is an administrative function engaged in as a
docket management tool. The Court has an inherent right to manage its
case docket."'231
Thus, prior to striking a petition filed in violation of 109(h), the
Elmendorf court stated that courts should determine if abuse is present, and
if so, strike the petition with prejudice to future filings. This determination
is based on several factors, which may include
the number of previous bankruptcy filings; whether the previous filings
were dismissed/stricken for failure to file a credit counseling certificate;
thereby signaling debtor's awareness to the requirement; whether a
secured creditor was sought to be stayed by the filing; whether the debtor
is acting in concert with others to forestall a secured creditor; whether the
debtor has filed all the required schedules and statements with the
petition; whether there was little or no effort to reorganize in prior filed
cases; or other indications that a debtor is abusing the protections of the
automatic stay. 232
By reviewing petitioners on a case-by-case basis instead of a one-
remedy-fits-all approach, the Elmendorf court left room to punish abusive
filing, while preserving the future bankruptcy benefits of petitioners who
innocently fail to receive credit counseling. Innocent petitioners will have
their petitions stricken, while petitioners deemed abusive will have their
petitions stricken with prejudice to future filings under the court's 105(a)
powers. 2 33
III. PETITIONS FILED IN VIOLATION OF 109(h) SHOULD BE STRICKEN OR,
UPON A FINDING OF ABUSE, SHOULD BE STRICKEN WITH PREJUDICE TO
FUTURE FILINGS
The arguments advanced by dismissal courts 234 are inconsistent with a
plain reading of the statute235 and the stated legislative intent of the 109(h)
229. See In re Elmendorf, 345 B.R. at 503-04.
230. Id. at 503.
231. Id. (citing Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991)).
232. Id. at 503 n.24.
233. Id. at 504. The Elmendorf court determined that Lena Elmendorf filed in good faith
and struck her petition whereas Diana Finlay's previous filings indicated abuse of the
system. Id. The court stated that her petition should be stricken with prejudice to future
filings, but because the U.S. Trustee failed to ask for that relief, the petition was stricken. Id.
Despite her husband's previous filings, the court decided that Shayna Zarnel's petition
should be stricken because it was her first filing. Id. at 505.
234. See supra Part II.A.
235. See supra Part II.A.2, B.2.
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credit counseling requirement. 236 While the concerns regarding uncertainty
with the automatic stay may make the dismissal approach seem
appealing, 237 the conclusion that petitions filed in violation of 109(h)
commence a case limit the benefits available to individuals in a future
filing238-a result inconsistent with the congressional goal of implementing
credit counseling as a "debtor protection. ' 239  Furthermore, such an
interpretation will give individuals who are ineligible for bankruptcy
immediate (albeit temporary) access to the protection of the automatic
stay, 240 an odd outcome, incompatible with the intent of BAPCPA. 241
The plain and practical interpretation of BAPCPA is that no case is
commenced when a petition is filed in violation of 109(h). The relevant
subsections, 242 which fall under the subchapter entitled "Commencement of
a Case," 243 provide that a case "is commenced by the filing with the
bankruptcy court of a petition.., by an entity that may be a debtor." 244
Thus, the mere filing of a petition does not commence a case-rather the
petition must be filed by an individual that may be a debtor.2 45 To
determine whether an individual "may be a debtor," one must logically turn
to section 109 entitled "Who may be a debtor." 246 One of the requirements
listed in section 109 to qualify an individual as a debtor 247 is the
requirement that an individual obtain credit counseling within the 180 days
preceding the bankruptcy filing. 248 The rational and practical reading of
both sections 301 and 109 supports a straightforward argument: (1)
Individuals who have not received credit counseling or qualified for a
waiver are ineligible to be debtors under section 109; (2) only individuals
eligible to be debtors under 109 may commence a case under section 301;
therefore (3) a petition filed by an individual who does not receive credit
counseling does not commence a case.249 As a result, there is no case to
dismiss and the petition must be stricken.250
The Tomco court251 attempts to bypass this logic by interpreting the
words "may be a debtor" to mean the filer only "ha[s] the possibility of
being a debtor." 252 While an expansive interpretation of statutory language
236. See supra Part I.B.
237. See supra Part II.A.3.b.
238. See supra notes 128-29 and accompanying text.
239. See supra note 49.
240. See supra notes 195-99 and accompanying text.
241. See supra Part I.B.
242. 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 301-03 (West 2004 & Supp. 2006); see also supra note 111.
243. 11 U.S.C.A. ch. 3 subch. 1.
244. Id. § 301.
245. See supra notes 212-16 and accompanying text.
246. 11 U.S.C.A. § 109.
247. Id.
248. Id. § 109(h); see also supra Part I.A.
249. See supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text.
250. See supra Part II.B.2.a.
251. In re Tomco, 339 B.R. 145 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2006).
252. Id. at 159; see also supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
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has ample judicial support,253 such an expansive definition of the word
"may" in section 109 is inappropriate because section 109 is itself the more
particular defining clause for who "may be a debtor '254 as the language is
used in section 301.255 Under the Tomco court's expansive definition of
"may" in section 109, a person who fulfilled all of the section 109
requirements would thereby merely have the "possibility" to be a
debtor 256 -- and there would be no Code provision that determines who
actually is a debtor. This interpretation of section 109 should be rejected as
rendering section 109 essentially superfluous. 257
As it is a court's "duty 'to give effect, if possible, to every clause and
word of a statute,"' 258 the phrase "may be a debtor" as used in section 109
must mean that section 109 outlines the requirements to be a debtor under
the Code. Because "the cardinal rule [is] that a statute is to be read as a
whole," 259 the phrase "may be a debtor" in section 109 must be read as
introducing a clause that will clarify what the words "may be a debtor" are
intended to mean as used in section 301.260 The word "may" in section 109
accordingly cannot possibly have a more expansive meaning in section 109
than it does in section 301, which effectively sidelines the Tomco court's
semantic argument. 26 1 The logical section 109/301 syllogism 262 requires
the conclusion that petitions filed in violation of 109(h) do not commence a
bankruptcy case.
253. See United States v. Hartwell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 385, 396 (1867) ("The rule of strict
construction is not violated by permitting the words of the statute to have their full meaning,
or the more extended of two meanings, as the wider popular instead of the more narrow
technical one; but the words should be taken in such a sense, bent neither one way nor the
other, as will best manifest the legislative intent."); In re Copper, 314 B.R. 628, 637 (B.A.P.
6th Cir. 2006) ("Finally, it is also relevant that section 706(a) uses the word 'may' meaning
'might' or 'used to express possibility' or 'used to express opportunity or permission.' If
Congress had intended to leave the bankruptcy courts with absolutely no discretion in the
matter, it would have used the more mandatory phrase of 'shall be able to convert."'
(quoting Random House Unabridged Dictionary, supra note 117, at 1189)).
254. 11 U.S.C.A. § 109.
255. Id. §§ 109, 301; see also Rosendorf, supra note 215. It is imperative to read section
109 and 301 together because "the cardinal rule is that the statute is to be read as a whole...
since the meaning of statutory language, plain or not, depends on context." King v. St.
Vincent's Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 221 (1991).
256. See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
257. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 778 (1984) (Edwards, J.,
concurring) ("There is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that a statute should
not be construed so as to render any part of it 'inoperative or superfluous, void or
insignificant."' (quoting 2A C. Sands, Statutes and Statutory Construction, § 46.06 (4th ed.
1973))); see also supra note 107.
258. United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955) (quoting Montclair v.
Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1883)).
259. King, 502 U.S. at 221.
260. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
261. See supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
262. See supra notes 242-50 and accompanying text.
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The "surplusage" argument 263-that striking petitions would render a
provision of BAPCPA superfluous-is also without merit. The
Elmendorf264 court rejected this argument by breathing meaning back into
section 362(b)(21)(A) with the distinction between the curable failure to
satisfy section 109(g) 265 and the incurable failure to satisfy section
109(h). 266  This distinction effectively nullifies the 362(b)(21)(A)
surplusage argument.267
Other provisions of BAPCPA also lead to the conclusion that individuals
ineligible under 109(h) cannot commence a case.268 Although there are
many BAPCPA provisions that deal with dismissal of a bankruptcy case, 269
not one of these provisions indicates that failure to obtain credit counseling
is grounds for dismissal. 270 While the Tomco court makes a convincing
argument that cause for dismissal should not necessarily be limited to
enumerated statutory lists, 271 Congress did not list failure to obtain credit
counseling among the many causes for dismissal included in the same
statute that created this requirement. 272 This is a strong indication that an
individual ineligible under 109(h) has no case to dismiss. In fact, the only
other clause in BAPCPA that mentions 109(h) eligibility is the section
521(b)(1) requirement that a certificate of credit counseling be filed with
the court. 273 The failure to submit this certificate, however, is not listed as
a cause for automatic dismissal for failure to file certain documents under
521 (i). 2 74
Furthermore, the absence of 109(h) ineligibility as a cause for
dismissal275 correlates with the congressional intent of credit counseling as
a debtor protection. 276 If a petition filed in violation of 109(h) commences
a case, which must be subsequently dismissed because the individual failed
to receive credit counseling, the petitioner would be penalized through a
263. See supra Part II.A.2.c.
264. 345 B.R. 486 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006).
265. See supra notes 174-77 and accompanying text.
266. See supra notes 178-81 and accompanying text; see also Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S.
526, 536 (2004) ("[O]ur preference for avoiding surplusage constructions is not absolute.").
267. See supra Part II.A.2.c.
268. See supra Part II.B.2. While some dismissal courts look to pre-BAPCPA
jurisprudence regarding section 109(g), the Salazar court was right to conclude that due to
contradictions in pre-BAPCPA 109(g) interpretations, "regardless of one's view on § 109(h),
§ 109(g)'s treatment in case law cannot be entirely instructive." In re Salazar, 339 B.R. 622,
632 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2006); see also supra Part II.A.l.a. The Salazar court was also
correct to point out that, prior to BAPCPA's addition of section 362(c)(3), the determination
of whether to dismiss a case or strike a petition was a "difference without a distinction." In
re Salazar, 339 B.R. at 633; see also supra Part II.B.l.a.
269. See 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 52 1(i), 707, 1112, 1208, 1307 (West 2004 & Supp. 2006).
270. See supra Part II.B.2.b-c.
271. See supra notes 91-100 and accompanying text.
272. See supra Part II.B.2.b-c.
273. See supra Part II.B.2.c.
274. Id.
275. See supra Part II.B.2.b-c.
276. See supra note 49.
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bad-faith presumption in a second filing.277 This result is directly at odds
with the congressional intent of employing credit counseling as a debtor
protection. 278
Allowing individuals who have not received credit counseling to
nevertheless commence a case is also at odds with the congressional intent
of "eliminat[ing] abuse in the system" 279 and the belief that "bankruptcy
relief may be too readily available and is sometimes used as a first resort,
rather than a last resort. '280  If petitions filed in violation of 109(h)
commence a case, then those same ineligible petitioners are protected by the
automatic stay until the case is dismissed.281 Thus, an individual who has
not obtained credit counseling could nonetheless invoke "one of the most
powerful weapons known to law." 282 The automatic stay protects a debtor
from collection actions by creditors; 283 under the dismissal theory, an
individual could file a petition without obtaining the credit counseling and
gain the benefit of the automatic stay.284 It is difficult to see how this
interpretation would correlate with the attempt to curb abuse in the
system 285 and make bankruptcy a last resort.286 Although dismissal courts
point to section 362(c)(3) as a built-in restraint on serial filings, 287 this
provision would not stop an individual from filing again and again solely to
realize the benefits of the automatic stay for a few days,288 or long enough
to figure out how to prevent a collection action. While there will always be
those who seek to circumvent the system, it is important to observe the
abuse that could occur under both remedies. 289
If courts strike petitions, an ineligible petitioner would not have the
protection of the automatic stay,290 but could file a second petition without
the 362(c)(3) bad faith presumption. 29 1 Hypothetically, an individual could
file, refile, and refile again with no consequence. But there would not be
277. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(c)(3); see also Part II.B.3.b.
278. See supra Part I.B. Professor Block-Lieb argues that debtor protections with harsh
penalties for non-compliance are actually debtor punishments. See Block-Lieb, supra note
201, at 427, 429.
279. See H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act of 2005, H.R. Rep. No. 109-31(I), at 2 (2005).
280. See id. at 4.
281. See supra note 103.
282. In re Russo, 94 B.R. 127, 129 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988); see also In re Walker, 51 F.3d
562, 566 (5th Cir. 1995) ("The automatic stay is designed to protect debtors from creditors
and creditors from each other.").
283. See supra note 60 and accompanying text; see also 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(a) (West 2004
& Supp. 2006).
284. See supra notes 195-97 and accompanying text.
285. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
286. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
287. See supra notes 124-27 and accompanying text.
288. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
289. See supra Part II.A.3.a, B.3.a.
290. See supra notes 187-94 and accompanying text. But see supra notes 212-16 and
accompanying text
291. See supra notes 199-200 and accompanying text.
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much benefit. The ineligible individual would never receive the automatic
stay 292 and would not be able to prevent a collection action until the 109(h)
credit counseling provision is satisfied.
Of these two potentially "abusive" alternatives, 293 the former is clearly
the worse. Allowing an individual repeatedly to invoke the protections of
the automatic stay is undoubtedly at odds with the congressional intent of
BAPCPA as a means to reduce abusive behavior 294 and "restore[] personal
responsibility and integrity in the bankruptcy system. '295 Striking petitions
filed in violation of 109(h) and keeping the automatic stay out of the
ineligible petitioner's reach is most congruent with the purpose of the
statute.
Striking petitions undoubtedly creates a level of uncertainty with regards
to the automatic stay,296 and this uncertainty, admittedly, is avoided by the
dismissal courts.297 Eliminating this uncertainty, however, is not worth the
price of giving individuals who have failed to obtain credit counseling the
right to commence cases repeatedly in order to invoke the automatic stay.298
The stated congressional intent of BAPCPA is to curb abuse of the system
and restore personal accountability. 299 Dismissal courts would tolerate
more abuse to reduce uncertainty, 300 while striking courts would tolerate
more uncertainty to reduce abuse. 301 Congress has made its choice clear.302
The House Report on BAPCPA 30 3 is filled with discussion of abusive
debtor practices and has an overarching goal of eliminating bankruptcy
abuse.30 4  Congress has chosen to curb abuse even if uncertainty
increases. 30 5  "Deciding what competing values will or will not be
sacrificed to the achievement of a particular objective is the very essence of
legislative choice," 306 and courts accordingly should seek to minimize
abusive practices even at the expense of uncertainty in the system.307
292. See supra notes 204-07 and accompanying text.
293. See supra notes 279-92 and accompanying text.
294. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
295. H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection
Act of 2005, H.R. Rep. No. 109-31(I), at 2 (2005).
296. See supra notes 204-06 and accompanying text.
297. See supra Part II.A.3.b.
298. See supra notes 279-89 and accompanying text.
299. See supra Part I.B.
300. See supra notes 195-98 and accompanying text.
301. See supra Part II.B.3.c.
302. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
303. See H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act of 2005, H.R. Rep. No. 109-31(I), at 2 (2005).
304. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
305. See supra notes 206-11 and accompanying text.
306. Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 526 (1987); see also Mansell v. Mansell,
490 U.S. 581, 594 (1989) ("Our task is to interpret the statute as best we can, not to second-
guess the wisdom of the congressional policy choice.").
307. Uncertainty in the judicial process is not unique to bankruptcy law. See supra note
210.
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Hence, a petition filed in violation of 109(h) should not commence a
bankruptcy case.
Finally, the outcome that most adheres to the legislative purpose of
BAPCPA30 8 is to not merely strike petitions, but to consider whether a
petition should be stricken "with prejudice to future filings."309  This
remedy is in line with courts' section 105(a)310 powers and allows a
situation-oriented remedy. 311 An individual showing signs of abusive
practices 312 would not only have their petition stricken, but would be
prevented from filing again in the future.313 An individual filing pro se, on
the other hand, who filed at the last minute to prevent foreclosure of a
family home would simply have their petition stricken.314 This individual
would be allowed to obtain credit counseling and refile without the penalty
of the 362(c)(3) bad faith presumption. 315 This solution is most congruent
with the dual legislative purposes of curbing abuse 316 and creating debtor
protections317 as it allows courts to fashion a remedy for abusive
petitioners, while allowing good faith petitioners to obtain credit counseling
and refile without consequence. 318
CONCLUSION
Individuals who have not received credit counseling as required under
section 109(h) of BAPCPA should not be treated as having commenced a
bankruptcy case, and the proper remedy is to strike the petition. A
straightforward reading of sections 109 and 301 demands such an
interpretation. Striking petitions of individuals ineligible under 109(h) will
also curb abuse of the bankruptcy process by preventing petitioners who
have failed to obtain credit counseling from realizing the benefits of the
automatic stay. Striking petitions is most consistent with the legislative
purpose of BAPCPA and is the proper remedy for a petitioner who has not
satisfied the 109(h) credit counseling provision.
308. See supra Part I.B.
309. In re Elmendorf, 345 B.R. 486, 504 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006); see also supra Part
II.C.
310. 11 U.S.C.A. § 105(a) (West 2004 & Supp. 2006).
311. See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
312. See supra note 232 and accompanying text.
313. See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
314. See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
315. See supra notes 226-28 and accompanying text.
316. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
317. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
318. See supra note 227.
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